°źÂț”ș

Only 13 months ago, there were probably very few political analysts who would have bet on US foreign policy in the Middle East being a major focus in this year’s presidential race.

However, due to events that unfolded in the region following the Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel on 7 October 2023, the US finds itself heavily involved in the region’s crises.

The Israeli war on Gaza and Washington’s role in it has highlighted deep divisions in American society. The implications have been profound, with many Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans, a demographic whom Democrats have long taken for granted in every election, expressing disdain for the current administration and pledging not to vote for the Democratic presidential hopeful this year.

In the key battleground state of Michigan, the lack of Arab-American/Muslim-American support for Vice President Kamala Harris could be a game changer.

Regardless of whether Harris or former President Donald Trump wins next week’s presidential election, the next commander-in-chief will have no choice but to deal with numerous crises plaguing the Middle East, from Gaza and LebanonÌętoÌęYemen and Israel-Iran hostilities.

Although impossible to know what the Middle East will look like when America’s 47th presidentÌęenters the Oval Office on 20 January 2025, it is difficult to imagine the violence in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the region ending by then.

In Iran and the Arab world, governments hope to see President Joe Biden’s successor take steps to de-escalate regional conflicts and rein in Israel. Fears of the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts further regionalising and internationalising are widespread among policymakers throughout the Middle East, especially given the potential for an all-out war between Israel and Iran.

“The most important issue is Gaza, not only because the genocide has continued without respite but also because it is at the root of larger tensions in the region as Israel expands its assault. The siege on northern Gaza is especially alarming in what amounts to an ethnic cleansing campaign to clear northern Gaza of its inhabitants and what the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called ‘the darkest moment’ of the conflict,’” said Dr Assal Rad, a Middle East scholar, in an interview with °źÂț”ș.

“Israel's invasion of Lebanon and bombing of Iran, Syria, and Iraq escalate the risk of full-scale war with Iran that may draw the US into a more direct confrontation,” she added.

For years there has been a relative decline in US hegemony that is set to continue with great power competition involving China and Russia playing out in the region. How states in the Middle East adjust to these new realities will do much to shape the region’s geopolitical order and influence Washington’s foreign policy in this part of the world.

“I believe we're at a critical inflection point in US-Middle East relations. The American position in the region has eroded significantly since 2003, and the current Gaza conflict has accelerated this decline,” Dr Steven Wright, an associate professor of International Relations at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, told TNA.

“From my perspective, the next president faces a significant challenge: developing a strategy that not only ends the Gaza war but also provides a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Without this, regional powers will increasingly seek pragmatic alternatives - we are already seeing this in the recent Gulf-Iran diplomatic engagement. Middle Eastern states are naturally gravitating toward more balanced relationships with global powers like China and Russia, so the US's future engagement in the region is very much at stake,” he added.

The view from Iran

President Masoud Pezeshkian has signalled his desire to improve Tehran’s relations with the US and other Western powers. Like many in his country, he wants to see Iran secure some degree of sanctions relief, which the Iranian economy desperately needs.Ìę

If either Harris or Trump responds diplomatically to Pezeshkian’s overtures, rather than with more threats, pressure, and sanctions, there would be, for the most part, a positive reception in Tehran. However, the picture is complicated, and it is difficult to speak about the Islamic Republic having any one perspective on this year’s US presidential election. Within the Iranian state, there are many different factions and individuals with diverse agendas and views.

Some will present a narrative about the Islamic Republic having practically nothing at stake in this election. “There will be those in the system who likely believe that the US election shouldn't have any impact on Iranian strategy - if it hardens Washington's approach the damage can be absorbed, and if it leads to opportunities for engagement, it should be ignored,” Dr Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, told TNA.

“Among hardliners in particular, it’s the regime's relations with Russia, China, Gulf neighbours, and the developing world that matter more than the US or Europe. But that’s a view rooted in ideology rather than reality, where US policy does matter a great deal. The dialling up of sanctions or their relaxation, for example, does carry implications for the Iranian economy. So does the risk of confrontation against US allies, or the US itself, in the region,” he added.

But it is unclear whether either Harris or Trump would ease any of Washington’s sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Harris recently called Iran the US’s greatest adversary. In May 2018, Trump sabotaged the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) before imposing “maximum pressure” on Iran. Since leaving the White House in January 2021, he has the Biden-Harris administration for being soft on Tehran.

For certain segments in Iran, a Harris win would be preferable given that her presidency could represent some degree of continuity with Biden’s foreign policy. Specifically, this could entail a US-Iran dialogue with the possibility of tactical understandings.

“For some in Iran, a Harris win could be a welcome respite from the heightened unpredictability associated with Trump. However, expectations are that US policy will largely continue along the same trajectory established under Biden, with Iran facing similar containment efforts but potentially with some diplomatic engagement avenues to settle the nuclear issue,” explained Dr Mehran Haghirian, the director of regional initiatives at the London-based Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, in a TNA interview.

Nonetheless, as Dr Vaez noted, “Whether on nuclear or regional issues, the path is far more difficult than when Biden took office: Not only have concerns worsened but new ones have been added, such as the Iran-Russia military relationship”.

Although Trump speaks about his plans to reach a deal with Tehran, it appears likely that he would intensify various forms of pressure on Iran in a second term. This would include going after Iranian oil exports to China via third countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Malaysia and continuing Biden’s policies of giving Israel support in its military actionsÌęagainst the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in multiple Arab countries, as well as direct strikes against the Iranian homeland.

Nonetheless, certain elements in the Islamic Republic would welcome Trump’s return to the White House. “For some in Iran, a Trump victory could be seen as a unique opportunity to address longstanding issues directly with Washington. For more hawkish elements, however, a Trump presidency might represent an invitation to intensify the US-Iran tensions, potentially allowing Iran to leverage Trump’s volatility in ways that could alter the balance of power in the region, particularly if the Israeli wars in Gaza and Lebanon continue,” Dr Haghirian told TNA.

“Iran views US policy toward Tehran as relatively consistent across both Republican and Democratic administrations under current circumstances and considering the divided US Congress,” said Dr Haghirian.

“A Harris administrationÌęwouldÌęlikely exert less direct pressure compared toÌęTrump, butÌęTrump’s unpredictability presents a unique challenge - and possibly an opportunity - for Tehran. Some factions within Iran see a potential advantage in testingÌęTrump’s unpredictable approach, rather than enduring another four years of the status quo,” he added.

Given that the Islamic Republic will possibly transition to its third Supreme Leader during the next four years, either Harris or Trump might be at the helm of US foreign policy at a time of an important transition within the Iranian political system. How either would respond to Ali Khamenei’s eventual passing will be important to the future of US-Iran relations.

Gulf Arab monarchies

Leaders in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members are gravely concerned about the continual expansion of conflicts in the Middle East. The Biden administration’s handling of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon is a major source of frustration for Gulf Arab officials who desperately want to see the White House apply pressure on Israel.

Instead of doing that, however, the Biden team has given Israel unconditional support and refused to restrict weapons transfers to Tel Aviv, giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government reason to conclude that it can act without facing consequences.

All GCC states are terrified by Israel and Iran’s escalatory trajectory, fearing a possible full-blown regional war that engulfs the entire region. The risks of regional turmoil spilling into the Gulf increase with the Gaza and Lebanon wars continuing without any ceasefire being implemented while many in the Middle East may have to come to terms with the normalisation of direct Israel-Iran confrontations.

Among the Gulf Arab states there is little optimism about either Harris or Trump making any fundamental changes in Washington’s foreign policy that could address root causes of instability and lead to more peace in the region.

“I sense a growing concern that neither candidate may fundamentally alter the current trajectory. The Gulf states have watched the Biden administration's handling of the Gaza crisis with increasing frustration as the extended conflict, now spilling into Lebanon, is clear evidence of Washington's diminishing ability to manage regional stability,” Dr Wright told TNA.

In the eyes of many Gulf Arabs, Harris represents continuity in Washington’s current Middle East policies. Mindful of the past nearly 13 months, policymakers and citizens of GCC states find that disturbing. If there is a Harris presidency, Gulf leaders would want concrete actions, not rhetoric. Their hope would be for Washington to reset its foreign policy in relation to Gazaand embrace diplomacy that addresses Palestinian grievances instead of taking a one-sided approach that fully backs Israel.

Leaders of GCC states might view Trump as “potentially more likely to take decisive action on ending the Gaza conflict,” explained Dr Wright in a TNA interview.

“Based on his recent statements, I believe they view him as someone who might exert more direct pressure on Netanyahu as he has been more forthright than Harris. Trump's deal-making approach and desire for visible diplomatic wins could also accelerate efforts toward a settlement, but the bottom-line is that both candidates are fully supportive of Israel and unlikely to exert any real pressure,” said the Doha-based scholar.

Jordan and Egypt

In much closer proximity to Israel-Palestine and Lebanon than Iran and the six GCC states, Jordan and Egypt have felt much heat from the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. In the case of Jordanians, they view this US election through three main lenses, explained Dr Sean Yom, an expert on Middle East politics at Temple University.

First, there is the annual foreign aid which Washington provides Amman. On this issue, there is not much at stake in terms of the Harris versus Trump race.

Second, there is US support for Jordan’s external security vis-à-vis external threats on the Hashemite kingdom’s borders with Syria and Iraq. Also, on this front, it seems unlikely that Harris and Trump would take fundamentally different positions.

Third, and most important to how Jordan’s political establishment views next month’s US presidential election, is the question of how the two candidates would approach the Palestinian issue.

Regarding this third lens, Jordan’s government firmly backs the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state with the Jordanian monarchy maintaining its custodianship over certain holy sites and no displacement of Palestinians to Jordan as part of an “alternative homeland.”

In general, Jordanians do not expect either Harris or Trump to restrain Israel’s war machine. However, they do have major concerns about a return of Trump and his ‘Deal of the Century’ idea, which would “foreclose the possibility of a meaningful Palestinian state and embolden the ‘alternative homeland’ zealots in Israel,” Dr Yom told TNA.

“Jordan ferociously opposed the Deal of the Century during Trump's first term and criticised the Abraham Accords in 2020 rightly because creating Gulf peace partners with Israel was necessary to effectuate that one-state proposal. Jordanians thus fear that more progress will be made to realise this vision under Trump, including efforts to create a Saudi-Israeli peace treaty and further marginalisation of the Palestinian Authority. This could also sacrifice Hashemite custodianship over Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem, which King Abdullah has repeatedly stated is the red line, in favour of complete Israeli control - as the first Trump administration floated,” he added.

Dr Yom maintains that a Harris presidency would be less extreme in terms of US policies toward the West Bank because she would officially support a two-state solution. While that solution is “virtually dead”, Amman would see it as a better one to pursue than Trump and Jared Kushner’s ‘Deal of the Century’ agenda, which would empower right-wing Zionism more than any plan that a Harris team would probably try to advance.

Egypt’s government led by President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi would probably prefer a Trump victory. During Trump’s first term, he did much to improve Washington-Cairo relations. In general, the Egyptian government tends to favour working with Republicans as opposed to Democrats.

A major reason why relates to human rights. Under both Barack Obama and Biden, the US withheld aid to Egypt on human rights grounds. But Trump took a fundamentally different approach that made human rights in Egypt a far lower priority when it came to working with the Sisi government.

“Trump turned a blind eye to the contentious issue of human rights and the Egyptian regime’s purported excesses, calling Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi his ‘favorite dictator,’” noted Shahira Amin, an Egyptian journalist and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, in a TNA interview.

Nonetheless, the US-Egypt alliance has been quite strong under Biden. This has largely been due to the White House needing to turn to Cairo for much diplomatic assistance vis-Ă -vis Hamas and Israel, both in the 2021 and 2023-24 Gaza conflicts.

Put simply, irrespective of who wins next month’s US election, it is safe to assume that Washington will continue valuing its alliance with Egypt and considering the country an anchor of regional stability. Given the extent to which Egypt faces serious economic problems, which Red Sea insecurity and conflict in neighbouring Sudan have worsened, Sisi will probably be content to work with any US administration that values his leadership and Cairo’s role in the Middle East.

US foreign policy must evolve

The next US president should prioritise repairing the image of America in the Middle East and other regions of the world. The past 13 months of Washington supporting Israel’s high-tech slaughter in Gaza has badly damaged the US’s reputation in the Arab-Islamic world.

The Biden administration has avoided engaging in effective diplomacy in the post-7 October 2023 period, which has greatly contributed to much chaotic turmoil in the Middle East. Today even many of Washington’s close friends in the region are frustrated with US leadership like never before.

“The Biden administration missed several opportunities to call for a ceasefire and secure a hostage deal between Hamas and Israel. Instead, it abetted Israel's vengeful war,Ìęinsisting that Israel had a right to defend itself. In so doing, it undermined both its core values: universal rights, equality and dueÌęprocess, and its interests, prompting activists in the Middle East to accuse the US administration of double standards and hypocrisy,” said Amin.

De-militarising Washington’s foreign policy, investing in soft-power influence and diplomacy, and working on reaching a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians is what Amin believes the next US administration must do.

Pointing to the Iraq war, which many US policymakers failed to learn from, the Egyptian journalist told TNA that Washington continues to unwisely resort to military intervention too frequently.

“Providing Israel with weapons to eradicate Hamas and Hezbollah will neither make the Middle East - nor the US - safer and more stable; diplomacy will,” Amin told TNA.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

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