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“Because of developments in the region, the moment is ripe,” to reach a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, to Jack Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor.

This air of optimism is not new. We saw it before in May, before Netanyahu dashed it by insisting on maintaining Israeli troops in the Philadelphia Corridor between Gaza and Egypt.��

He did so again in talks between Doha and Cairo, either by stripping the Israeli negotiating team of authority or by taking a decorative position without committing to anything.��

Netanyahu’s political survival has been cited as the primary motive for his intransigence.

But Sullivan is right about one thing: the regional scene is different to what it was a month ago.

Israel is allegedly in a more comfortable position to "give concessions" after it has signed a "fragile ceasefire" with Hezbollah. Syria has been hit by a political earthquake, which led to President Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country and Iran losing much of its foothold in the region. Hamas in Gaza, therefore, is believed to have been left isolated with fewer options to bargain with.

Hamas is showing "signs of flexibility" in a ceasefire deal. It may accept an initial truce for sixty days with a temporary Israeli presence in Gaza to be followed by gradual withdrawal over the coming months.

In return, a limited prisoner swap will take place. The hope is that the truce will eventually materialise into an end to the war.

Hamas previously insisted that unless Israel had officially ended the war and withdrew from the Strip any deal was off the table. There was no guarantee that after exchanging prisoners with Israel, Tel Aviv was not going to resume the slaughter.

Still, the question remains whether this so-called Hamas flexibility, if at all true, is due to the changes in the regional scene or something else.

The carrot and stick in Gaza

After fifteen months of the war, Hamas and other resistance groups — albeit weakened and despite the incomparable gap in military power between them and Israel — are still fighting and inflicting losses on the Israeli army.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah does not seem to have affected that.

There are also speculations that the regional shift, while presumably negative for Palestinians, is simply a return to the original setting: Palestinians fighting for their survival alone as they had done for decades.

The reason behind the flexibility could be that the situation in Gaza has reached a tragic level of saturation. Netanyahu is likely to claim credit, arguing that the escalating military pressure led to this saturation, rendering Hamas unable to maintain its fighting momentum.

But this rhetoric ignores the reality that Israel’s monstrous military campaign cannot be escalated further. It, too, is saturated. More bombing can yield more destruction and a lot of casualties, but won’t achieve the Israel-declared war objectives: eliminating Hamas and retrieving the captives.

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For Gazans, the situation is saturated in terms of them hitting their absolute rock bottom: routinely killed, displaced, and starved.

Some wonder — save for total annihilation — if further misery is humanly achievable. Their only salvation comes through the end of the slaughter. In a ceasefire or a deal, labels do not matter, and any technicalities can be discussed later.

Hamas understands this and is likely feeling the intense internal pressure, hence caving into "stopping the mass killing of Palestinians first", then worrying about the details later: exchange of prisoners, Israeli withdrawal, return of the displaced people to their homes in Northern Gaza, and reconstruction.����

In Tel Aviv, the situation is not less complex. Besides the “ripe regional scene”, Netanyahu is reportedly by Donald Trump to before the latter has been inaugurated into the White House on January 20.

Free of electoral pressure and political ambitions, Biden may want to conclude his shameful legacy on Gaza with a ceasefire and he has been reportedly�� with Trump to push for a ceasefire deal.

That said, if the next Trump administration were to arrive at the White House with a ceasefire deal in place, it would likely be maintained on terms favouring Netanyahu, which include a long-term Israeli military presence/occupation in Gaza — a security situation parallel to that of the West Bank.

What is more, Trump has his eyes fixed on curbing Iran’s nuclear programme and normalising ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Neither is realistically obtainable without ending the Gaza war. Israelis, too, see a historic window to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, and clearing the Gaza backlog will allow the Israeli army to refocus its energy eastwards.

Netanyahu understands or has gradually realised that his Gaza war objectives are not realistic, and neither were the initial plans to ethnically cleanse Gaza in full, thanks to Palestinian resolute and Egyptian resistance.��

As an alternative, the Israeli army has been substantiating the geographical division of Gaza into three parts. The goal is to ensure Israeli military presence and security control in Gaza, and to that as a bargaining chip to drain Hamas, and any Palestinian leadership, of any strategic options.��

Palestinians understand from history that Israeli boots on the ground are typically followed by settlements. And then settlements become a ‘Jewish historical right’, and a Jewish right turns into a right to expel Palestinians from their homes.

Even if Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, it can still dangle the carrot of reconstruction to shape the outcome in its favour: do as we say, or Gazans will continue to live in the ruins of what used to be their homes. There will not be building materials or machinery allowed into Gaza.��

Normalising Gaza as an uninhabitable place will encourage people to leave. “Half of Gazans will be encouraged to leave,” to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.��

Assuming this time the circumstances for a ceasefire are ‘ripe’ and assuming a ceasefire holds, the day after the war remains hazy. The period between a ceasefire and reconstruction will perhaps be the most critical.

Who guarantees Israel will withdraw completely from Gaza? And if it does, won’t the reconstruction efforts be obstructed and used as a means of political pressure?

More importantly, what guarantees that after the war Israel will not go back to the pre-war siege of Gaza, the primary reason for the October 7 attack?

Dr Emad Moussa is a Palestinian-British researcher and writer specialising in the political psychology of intergroup and conflict dynamics, focusing on MENA with a special interest in Israel/Palestine. He has a background in human rights and journalism, and is currently��a��frequent contributor to multiple academic and media outlets, in addition to being a consultant for a US-based think tank.

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