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Iran, facing its own domestic Kurdish separatism and unbendingly opposed to Iraqi Kurdish separatism, has become an immovable hegemonic force over and through the Iraqi government. 

The trend in Kurdistan towards separatism has been one determined not by "divisive nationalism" or "tribalism", but rather a reaction to the divisive sectarianism and increasing incompetence of the Iraqi central government. It's hardly a surprise that 92 percent of residents of Iraqi Kurdistan voted for independence. 

And while it's perfectly true that the KRG is not without its own instances of chauvinism, such as demolishing the homes of Sinjar Arabs forced to flee by IS in areas such as Kirkuk, wherein 30 percent of the population are Arabs, the vote was still  of independence. 

Meanwhile, in Catalonia, we've seen a similar phenomenon. 

While the quest for Catalonian independence from Spain has deep historic roots, its modern spike can be located less in nationalist fervour and more in political factors relating to the Spanish central government. 

Catalonian separatism or nationalism is much like its Scottish counterpart in that it conceives of 'nationality' in civic and not ethnic terms

Catalonian separatism or nationalism is much like its Scottish counterpart in that it conceives of "nationality" in civic and not ethnic terms, while it embraces a multicultural, pro-European vision of a Catalan state. 

While successive Spanish governments have gone down the road of deindustrialisation and privatisation, the Executive Council of Catalonia has to retain an industrial economy and bolster social provisions. Not only has this been contrary to the policy of Madrid, but the Spanish government has , refusing to give Catalonia a meaningful form of fiscal autonomy. 

The economic case put forward by the separatists is that the prosperous and populous Catalonia must pay $12 billion more tax revenue to Madrid than it receives from central government, while Andalusia, the poorest region in Spain, recieves nearly $10bn more than it contributes. This lack of fiscal independence, say critics, has left the Catalan executive struggling to provide basic services. 

In comparison to the one-sided but lucrative economic grasp Spain has on Catalonia, Iraq has a similar situation with the oil-rich areas of Kurdistan, such as Kirkuk, which Iraq's sectarian militias have to invade and occupy; effectively declaring war.

Only independence would allow Catalans and Kurds complete and uninhibited access to and control over their wealth and resources without being accountable to Madrid or Baghdad.

The Spanish state argues that the referendum is illegal and unconstitutional, but, forgetting even the fact that the Catalan parliament voted to hold it, the primary reason they did so was due to the right-wing Spanish government's of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy which gave Catalonia more powers. 

This is precisely why, despite the huge amounts of state intimidation and brutality by Spain, 91 percent of Catalonians supported independence. If the Spanish government had been willing to cede these powers, it's almost certain that the independence referendum would not have taken place in these circumstances. 

We live in an age that has simultaneously witnessed the breaking up of national and state order

The reaction to the votes in Kurdistan and Catalonia by the Iraqi and Spanish governments typifies a wider trend engulfing the world. We live in an age that has simultaneously witnessed the breaking up of national and state order, and what appears to be the bolstering of such order. Beyond the domestic confines of revolution and counter-revolution, such as we've witnessed in Egypt, Syria and Bahrain to name but a few, the dynamic of popular revolt against centralised authority and the often-brutal reaction to such challenges is by no means confined to these localities.

The Spanish state, an alleged liberal democracy, has reacted to the vote with , including allegations of torture and sexual assault against protesters. 

The EU has done little to pressure the Spanish state to curtail its violence, while the international community, terrified as ever of separatism, has been equally toothless in the face of the gross violations being carried out against peaceful Catalans by the Spanish state. 

The Iraqi state has similarly refused to recognise the vote in Kurdistan, a refusal that could in theory lead to armed conflict.

The US and Iran have followed suit, with Ayatollah Khamenei the KRG "opponents of Iraq's independence" and one of his leading advisers Barzani of being a "middleman for Zionists". 

Read more: Israel 'sole supporter' of independence referendum in Iraq's Kurdistan

Assad similarly denounced the vote, while called the vote "a step towards partition" in the Middle East, seemingly forgetting their role in viciously carving up Syria. 

It was Vladimir Lenin who once wrote of the 1917 Russian revolution not as an abberation, but as a "weakest link" in a chain of globalised states that had been rocked by the events of the First World War.

Russia was the first to "fall", so to speak, following the huge social and moral upheavals of the war because its social structures were weaker than those of western liberal democracies, while its society was in general more repressive and directly exploitative. 

This is the way the world must be viewed, whether it's in more extreme cases such as Syria or Egypt, where oppression and exploitation is of a higher and more explicit level, or in western liberal democracies, where oppression and exploitation are more gradually erosive. Each represents a link in a chain that itself has been generally weakened by a world that is determined to steep itself in regressive self-interest. 


Sam Hamad is an independent Scottish-Egyptian activist and writer.

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of °®Âþµº, its editorial board or staff.