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Taking the Yemeni crisis to Riyadh is not the end of the road. It is the beginning of a new journey along a path strewn with mines and pitfalls. The journey is amid regional and international polarisation. and conflicting priorities.

"After the sky becomes clear it will get cloudy again", one Yemeni saying goes.

This sums up the crisis in Yemen today, which is poised to be transferred to Saudi Arabia's capital Riyadh.

King Salman bin Abdul Aziz and GCC leaders have accepted Yemen’s president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi's request for a peace conference to be held in Saudi Arabia, after it proved impossible for rival parties to sit around the same table in Yemen.

Bargaining chips 

There was a belief that the release of Hadi along with most members of his cabinet by the Houthi movement, who relocated from Sanaa to Aden, would be the beginning of a way out of the crisis.

It was thought that popular pressure in both the south and north of Yemen would isolate the Houthis and force them to return to a peace and partnership agreement brokered  signed in September 2014.

After leaving Sanaa, Hadi concentrated his efforts on restoring legitimacy at home and gaining support from the outside world.

In a short period of time, he was able to rally a large segment of the people in the south and the north against the Houthi coup. He has received external support through the relocation of many diplomatic missions from Sanaa to Aden.

However, none of this has forced the Houthis to change their behaviour. The Houthis now have the support of a strong ally inside Yemen in the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and from a strong external power in Iran.

Tehran's presence in the Yemeni crisis is now said to be very much explicit, as Iran is helping the Houthis consolidate and press ahead with their plans in the country.

It is important here to note how Iran rushed in to exploit the crisis in Yemen. For instance, Iran has swiftly launched an air route from Tehran to Sanaa at a rate of two trips per day.

Iran has also received a high-level "official" Houthi delegation. This sends out a clear message that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is not confined to political sympathy, but goes far beyond that.

A higher class

A series of leaked reports has suggested that Iran, and even Hizballah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, were involved in the coup against Yemen's president, Hadi. This was allegedly done in collaboration with Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The former president seems to spare no occasion to try and reset the situation in Yemen in a way that would drive Hadi completely out of the political scene.

While the Gulf countries are expressing their willingness to broker a political settlement in Yemen, there are concrete signs indicating that the Houthis will not impede the Riyadh talks.

However, the Houthis are engaging in manoeuvres to score political gains before joining the table at the GCC headquarters in Riyadh. The first of such gains would be to open the door for their Iranian ally to enter as an official player in the game.

There were reports that Russia was mediating behind the scenes to convince the Houthis to participate in the Riyadh talks.

If this were to happen, it will mean that both Iran and Russia would have booked themselves a seat at the table to wrap up the Syrian crisis.

Yet this will probably not be enough for the Houthis. The Houthis have enough political ammunition to detonate the dialogue at any moment.

The first obstacle they can erect in the dialogue is about their representation in the talks. Seeing how the Houthis consider themselves as being the strongest party in Yemen, they might not accept to take part in talks on the same par as other parties.

The Houthis believe the balance of power has shifted into their court.

So far, the talks have the Houthis treated on the same standard as other political parties and factions in Yemen. They will have the right to vote, but not to sway the talks.

However, in light of the facts on the ground, it is unlikely that the Houthis would agree to talks taking place on these lines, as they believe the balance of power has shifted into their court. Yemeni sources believe this is the most challenging obstacle in making the talks a success.

Burning bridges 

The second barrier has to do with Saleh. The former president was not invited to attend the dialogue talks personally; rather, the invitation was extended to his party, the General People's Congress (GPC). Influence in the party is contested between Saleh and Hadi.

But even if representatives of Saleh were directly invited to Riyadh, they would ultimately be allies of the Houthis.

In recent days, Saleh has regained the initiative despite the extension of UN sanctions on the leader whose personal fortune is estimated to be $60 billion.

Saleh made statements suggesting he intends to escalate the situation through a military operation in the south to expel Hadi and his supporters from Aden.

In a noteworthy speech before the GPC, he evoked the war of 1994, which he waged against his southern unity partners whom he ultimately expelled from Yemen.

"In 1994, [we] opened the road for [the southern leaders] to flee either by land to Saudi and Oman, or by sea to Djibouti. But for these people, we will only leave them a path by sea to Djibouti."

Saleh's threat is not to be scoffed at, given his military power in both the north and south.

Even in Aden, Saleh's supporters remain in control of a number of army units such as the central security special forces, whose commander Colonel Abdul-Hafez al-Saqqaf has refused to obey orders from Hadi to step down. 

Saqqaf is holed up in his base in central Aden and has allegedly threatening to burn the city down, and is an explicit supporter of Salah.

He declared his support for the Houthis late last year, and he is acting from a position of power. Protests in the south had failed to topple him in the past and he is accused of killing activists and running secret prisons in the city.

Saqqaf is holed up in his base in central Aden and has allegedly threatening to burn the city down.

1994, all over again

What all this means is that it is not unlikely that a scenario similar to the one in 1994 will be repeated, through which Saleh would present himself as someone holding the best cards that would allow him to play a key role in political proceedings in Yemen.

In light of this complex situation, the question that now appears is what cards do the Gulf countries have to put pressure on the Houthis and Saleh?

The Gulf does not have many strong cards to play vis-a-vis the Houthis, except through Iran.

Consequently, the Yemen issue is subject to bargaining, and in this bazaar of sorts, Iran has a higher margin for manoeuvring compared to the Gulf countries.

They do not have a unified position particularly as Oman has charted for itself a different foreign policy from the other five GCC nations.

In effect, Iran sees the Houthi chip as invaluable, a tool that they will use in negotiations with the Gulf over a broader bargain related to their role and position in all regional arrangements.

Iran already has huge responsibility in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and now Yemen is part of Iran's grand strategic calculus. These come back to Iran related matters that go beyond the region, such as the nuclear issue.

But regarding Saleh, the best card against him may be the threat to confiscate his assets, a large part of which is invested in Gulf countries.

If the UN Security Council adopts a firm position on possible seizing Saleh’s assets, he could recalculate and rein in his son Ahmad. Over the past two days, Ahmad has organised protests in Sanaa calling for him to run for the presidency.

Ultimately, the Gulf nations have a number of key priorities in Yemen, and for this reason, they are betting on the dialogue taking place in Riyadh.

The GCC's number one priority is Iran's role in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia believes is posing a real threat to them.

This threat would not stop at Yemen's border, given that there have been many allegations in the past about Iran's incitement of Shias in Saudi Arabia against the government.

The second priority is regional security, especially in relation to the Red Sea strait of Bab al-Mandeb. In fact, this is as much an international issue as it is regional.

The final consideration is al-Qaeda, which is a threat to both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This was the assessment made by many observers following the attack by al-Qaeda on the city of Mahfad in south Yemen two days ago.

In conclusion, there are many mines planted on the path to dialogue in Yemen, and some of these might explode before the talks convene in Riyadh.

With Ali Abdullah Saleh's threats to use military force for example, many are concerned that a military conflagration in the south would precede dialogue efforts to strip Hadi of his bargaining chips and impose a fait accompli on the ground.

As we saw in the storming of Sanaa by Houthi fighters that changed the political dynamics in Yemen, force could still be used as part of negotiations.

This article is an edited translation from our Arabic edition.

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.