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Since mid-April, a bloody conflict has plagued Sudan with all ceasefire attempts falling apart and the crisis spreading to more parts of the country.

The UN estimates that these four months of violence have resulted in about 4,000 deaths while activists and doctors on the ground in Sudan maintain that this is probably an underestimation. The conflict has also resulted in over one million people fleeing the country with approximately 3.5 million being internally displaced.

In a wider geopolitical context, Sudan’s situation is complicated. Many regional and global actors have vested stakes in the outcome of this crisis.

As warfare between General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on one side, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the other, continues wreaking havoc across Sudan, Gulf Arab heavyweights—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—play important roles as external actors.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states maintain deep-rooted relationships with Sudan and all six members of the sub-regional institution have deep interests in the country pertaining to food security, supply chains, terrorism threats, and other domains.

"As allies, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have coordinated on many regional and global files. But they are also rivals with a highly competitive relationship"

“Both [Saudi Arabia and the UAE] seek economic and strategic goals in Sudan — the country being a stepping stone from the Arabian Peninsula to Africa,” Dr Nabeel Khoury, the former deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Yemen, told °®Âţµş.

As allies, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have coordinated on many regional and global files. But they are also rivals with a highly competitive relationship, and there have been notable instances whereby Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s agendas, tactics, and interests have clashed.

Probably the most visible case has been Yemen, where Riyadh has supported a unified Yemeni nation-state while Abu Dhabi has sponsored the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in the south.

In terms of economics, commerce, and business, Saudi-UAE competition plays out while Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also feud within OPEC.

“The rivalry is partly a personal one, between [UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ)] and [Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)], with each vying for leadership of the Middle East and beyond,” explained Dr Khoury.

Asserting influence in Sudan

Sudan’s role in this rivalry has evolved in recent years. In the aftermath of President Omar al-Bashir’s 2019 ouster, Saudi Arabia and the UAE gained significant clout in Khartoum at Turkey and Qatar’s expense.

In the period that immediately followed Bashir’s fall, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s foreign policies vis-à-vis Sudan were quite aligned. Yet, amid the SAF-RSF conflict, the picture is more complicated.

“Sudan fits into the Saudi-Emirati competition for three reasons,” Dr Eleonora Ardemagni, a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, told TNA.

“The economic layer driving investments in agricultural lands, mining and infrastructure; the diplomatic layer through which the monarchies aim to build local leverage supporting negotiations and humanitarian diplomacy; and the geostrategic layer resulting [in their] alignment with rival factions long before the conflict erupted,” she said.Ěý

The UAE’s support for Hemedti

Having sent RSF fighters to Yemen and been supportive of General Khalifa Haftar in Libya’s civil war, Hemedti became the UAE’s main man in Sudan. Furthermore, the extent to which Hemedti has obtained power in post-Bashir Sudan is largely attributable to the support that Abu Dhabi has given him.

The UAE has backed Hemedti and the RSF while collaborating with the Wagner Group, which has maintained an active role in Sudan since the end of Bashir’s time in power.

“Reports suggest [Hemedti] has acted as a custodian of Emirati interests in Sudan, guarding gold mines controlled by Wagner; gold from these mines is then shipped to the UAE en route to Russia,” Dr Talal Mohammad, a scholar of Middle Eastern studies and an independent consultant in government affairs, geopolitics, and strategic intelligence.

“The three-way relationship between the UAE, the RSF, and Russia via the Wagner Group was cemented by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow became more dependent on gold and other finances to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The US Treasury Department recently sanctioned two firms associated with [Hemedti] that operate in the gold industry, Al Junaid and Tradive. They are based in Sudan and the UAE.”

"If violence continues ravaging Sudan, there might be good reason to assume that tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could heat up more"

Saudi diplomacy and leadership

Since April, Saudi Arabia has played somewhat of a balancing role in Sudan, seeking to position Riyadh as a peacemaker that is not necessarily firmly behind either al-Burhan or Hemedti.

However, with al-Burhan having more international legitimacy, the Kingdom has leaned toward backing al-Burhan over Hemedti.

In May, Saudi Arabia hosted SAF-RSF talks in Jeddah, which did not resolve Sudan’s conflict but at least constituted the first time in which both sides met face to face to address the ongoing crisis.

Moreover, the fact that they took place in Jeddah spoke to perceptions among the Sudanese parties of the Kingdom as a relatively neutral actor, which both the SAF and RSF could trust.

“I don’t think the Saudis will clearly take [a] side in this intra-military conflict, since they opted for showing the diplomatic face since the beginning of the 2023 crisis,” Dr Ardemagni told TNA.

“As the Emiratis are close to the RSF side, the only way for the Saudis to re-enter the Sudanese theatre from a position of force is playing the balancer role amid warring factions. This is also a way to further strengthen Saudi leadership in the Arab League, and to practically improve the relationship with the US through regional crisis management.”

As Dr Khoury explained, Emirati support for RSF mercenaries signals how the UAE has pursued a “more aggressive path” than Saudi Arabia in Sudan.

“Saudi Arabia’s role seems more defensive in nature and seeks to support a stable government (currently via General al-Burhan), but also potentially via a political settlement that may, if successful, bring forth a new civilian government,” said the former US diplomat.

Rising intra-Arab tensions vis-Ă -vis Sudan

If violence continues ravaging Sudan, there might be good reason to assume that tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could heat up more. Looking ahead, a key factor to keep an eye on is Egypt’s approach to its southern neighbour’s crisis.

Firmly supportive of al-Burhan and the SAF while staunchly opposed to Hemedti, Cairo could possibly launch an overt and extremely risky military campaign. The objectives would be to eliminate what Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government sees as a threat posed by the RSF while attempting to restore stability in Sudan.

If such a development pans out, friction between Egypt and the UAE would increase against the backdrop of the conflict in Ethiopia, adding more tension to Cairo’s relationship with Abu Dhabi.

"At the end of the day, Sudan is unlikely to be the top source of friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE"

Although an Egyptian military intervention that advances Cairo’s agenda in Sudan would probably favour Riyadh, it could leave the Saudi leadership facing challenges as the Kingdom seeks to act as a leader in the Arab world which unites Arab League members behind Saudi-led efforts to stabilise Sudan.

At the end of the day, Sudan is unlikely to be the top source of friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

But, depending on how events unfold and the direction in which Sudan’s crisis evolves in upcoming weeks and months, the Saudis may come to view the Emiratis as a thorn in their side as Riyadh attempts to work to restore peace.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.

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