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Houthis Yemen
7 min read
12 November, 2024

With Donald Trump set to re-enter the White House in January 2025 following his comfortable win in the November presidential election, anticipation and nerves over his foreign policy moves are already growing - especially regarding the Middle East.

Trump is expected to offer unequivocal support for Israel and revert to a hardline containment approach to Iran, both hallmarks of his first term as US President. He may also extend strong support to other US allies in the region, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

But how could his administration approach Yemen and the ongoing crisis in the Red Sea?

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Under Joe Biden’s outgoing administration, Washington has led a coalition of over 20 countries through ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ since December 2023, which aims to protect international shipping in the Red Sea.

It was enacted to counter the Houthis’ targeting of international trade in the crucial maritime corridor, which the group says is primarily aimed at Israeli-linked vessels to show solidarity with Palestinians and put pressure on Israel to end its onslaught in Gaza.

On Saturday, the US and the UK conducted another round of airstrikes on Houthi positions in Yemen, including in the capital Sana’a, a strategy they have employed since January to degrade Houthi military capabilities.

Biden's U-turn over Yemen and the Houthis

The current US stance represents a notable reversal of Biden’s earlier policies on Yemen and the Houthis. One of his first foreign policy actions was suspending offensive weapon sales to Saudi Arabia in February 2021 in response to the diplomatic backlash following an emerging humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

This move significantly curtailed the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing campaign, which had begun in March 2015 following a Houthi insurgency the previous year. Biden’s policy shift helped pave the way for a UN-brokered ceasefire agreement in April 2022, bringing Yemen to a fragile state of ‘no peace, no war’.

Biden also lifted the designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), a policy Trump had implemented during his first term. This change was intended to allow humanitarian aid to reach Yemen, but it also ended the Houthis’ international isolation.

As Yemen remained in political deadlock, the Houthis strengthened their control in Yemen, with assistance from Iran, which supplied them with advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, missiles, and even hypersonic missiles capable of reaching Israel and targeting Red Sea shipping lanes.

Houthis
The Houthis have vowed to continue their attacks in the Red Sea, raising questions about how Trump might respond. [Getty]

The Houthis, in short, have become a much more formidable force since Trump’s last presidency. Despite limited US and UK airstrikes aimed at degrading Houthi capabilities, the group has remained defiant.

While they have suffered some losses, their actions, which they continue to frame as supporting Palestinians, have gained them unprecedented popularity in Yemen and other Arab countries, strengthening their influence.

“Trump inherited from the Biden administration the US-led coalition’s actions against the Houthis, so these operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden will continue as long as Houthi attacks persist,” Ahmed Nagi, Yemen researcher at the International Crisis Group, told °źÂț”ș.

Will Trump take a firmer stance?

In a 7 November speech, Houthi leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi criticised the incoming Trump administration, asserting that Trump would fail to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict or bring peace to the region.

“Trump failed in the project of... the deal of the century despite all his arrogance, haughtiness, recklessness and tyranny, and he will fail this time as well,” the leader said.

The Houthis have also vowed to continue their attacks in the Red Sea, raising questions about how Trump might respond. He may well face pressure from potential advisors to re-adopt a tough stance on Iran and its allies, including the Houthis.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, researcher and Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute, suggests that Trump may revert to a ‘maximum pressure’ approach on Iran and its regional allies.

“This could include designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), using sanctions and economic pressure to isolate them rather than pursuing direct military confrontation,” she told °źÂț”ș.

Thomas Juneau, an Associate Professor at the University of Ottawa, agrees, noting that Trump is likely to take a harder position on the Houthis.

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Juneau warns, however, that while an FTO designation could pressure the Houthis, it might also hinder humanitarian aid delivery to Yemen, which still faces a dire humanitarian crisis despite the war’s end.

Ultimately, Trump’s approach to Iran will play a pivotal role. In 2018, he withdrew from the 2015 Nuclear Agreement, which had lifted sanctions in exchange for restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program. Observers widely expect a return to this containment approach, although this may not necessarily lead to a more aggressive military response to Houthi actions in the Red Sea.

“While Trump may prefer not to engage in a full-scale ground conflict in Yemen - consistent with his anti-war stance - his administration might intensify targeted strikes on high-ranking individuals or key military sites in Yemen to weaken Houthi capabilities,” said Ahmed Nagi.

How Washington's Gulf partners may react

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which spearheaded Yemen’s war, may have new expectations for a Trump presidency.

Although both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have tried to distance themselves from the Red Sea crisis, Bahrain’s participation in US-led Red Sea naval operations signals tacit support for Washington’s position.

Both countries have also worked to maintain ties with Iran following a rapprochement in late 2020, which gathered pace following the China-brokered normalisation agreement between Riyadh and Tehran in March 2023.

Whether Riyadh would abandon its ties with Tehran under pressure from Trump remains uncertain.

After all, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has already experienced a shift from Trump’s unconditional support to strained ties with Biden, learning in the process that relying on the US might not always be a safe bet.

Despite this, Trump has been known for his unwavering support for both MBS and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and there is a distinct possibility Trump may once again try to leverage Washington’s regional partnerships to counter Iran.

“The Trump administration could deepen security and defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, potentially enhancing their air and missile defences against the Houthis,” said Thomas Juneau.

If Trump pursues a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon the Houthis may be compelled to reduce their attacks in the Red Sea, albeit in the short term. [Getty]

Nadwa Al-Dawsari also anticipates Trump bolstering partnerships with regional allies to minimise US ground involvement while indirectly countering the Houthis.

Direct conflict remains undesirable for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, who are focused on economic reform and are wary of the diplomatic costs associated with Yemen’s war. Both nations have painful memories of Houthi strikes on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Abu Dhabi in 2022.

Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said that while Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may support a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign to the extent that it degrades Iran’s regional proxies, they are currently content with rapprochement with Iran.

“None of the Gulf states want to be seen as being on the ‘front line’ of a regional war between the US or Israel against Iran, and there’s no willingness to bear the brunt of being major US partners in the event of a regional war,” he told °źÂț”ș.

Dr Krieg added that the only ‘wildcard’ scenario is if Trump were to offer Saudi Arabia a comprehensive defence deal. However, this is unlikely to go through Congress and may hinge on Saudi Arabia’s normalisation with Israel.

While a significant shift in US policy in the Red Sea and Yemen seems unlikely, given Biden’s recent moves to counter the Houthis, Trump’s approach will also hinge on his handling of Israel’s conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.

If Trump pursues a ceasefire in both wars, as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have advocated, the Houthis may be compelled to reduce their attacks in the Red Sea, albeit in the short term.

Nonetheless, with the Houthis now a potent force in the Red Sea, the threat they pose to trade and stability will likely persist, potentially prompting a firm response from Trump in the future, though his exact strategy remains uncertain for now.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

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