Decoding Nasrallah: Hezbollah's strategy on the Israel-Hamas war
The first speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah last Friday since the start of the war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel could be condensed into one phrase: "All options are on the table".
But among the key takeaways of hisspeech, which lasted about one hour and twenty minutes, were useful indicators of Hezbollah’s strategy regarding its actions on the Israeli-Lebanese border and response to Israel’s ground invasion.
Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah wasn't involved in Hamas' Operation al-Aqsa Flood but clarified that operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border are an expression of solidarity with Gaza, signalling that there won't be an immediate full-scale involvement in the conflict.
Rather, Hezbollah's operations are contingent on events in Gaza and the group will continually assess the level of escalation it will pursue on the Lebanese border against Israel.
"It was a careful and cautious articulated speech, but at the same time very powerful," Imad Salamey, associate professor of Middle Eastern political affairs at the Lebanese American University, told .
"Nasrallah's strategy, as outlined in his speech, aims to make Israel 'carefully calculate' its actions on Lebanon's southern border and to influence Israel's approach to military operations in Gaza"
"Nasrallah managed high expectations for Hezbollah effectively by strategically delivering a well-orchestrated speech that kept the enemy in suspense about the party's military plans, all without making unrealistic promises," he said.
Joe Macaron, a global fellow with the Wilson Center's Middle East Program, told TNA that the overall Hezbollah strategy outlined in Nasrallah's speech matched the current engagement against Israel.
"The main messages were unsurprising. The primary focus is on Gaza, with southern Lebanon attempting to divert attention and alleviate pressure on it. The second message was a direct call to the United States to intensify pressure until it compels Israel to agree to a ceasefire," he said.
Nasrallah's strategy, as outlined in his speech, aims to make Israel "carefully calculate" its actions on Lebanon's southern border and to influence Israel's approach to military operations in Gaza.
Such a deterrent approach is tailored to Hezbollah's current operations.
"They initially started to use anti-tank missiles to target the Israeli border and precision weapons to avoid civilian casualties. They primarily targeted the Shebaa Farms (a narrow disputed strip, now a military zone, at the Lebanese-Syrian border and Israeli-occupied Golan Heights),” Nicholas Blanford, an expert on Hezbollah and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, told TNA.
“However, they recently expanded their attacks to evacuated Israeli settlements near the border. This escalation might have been influenced by anticipation of Nasrallah's speech, in which he hinted at readiness for further escalation. Hezbollah introduced new weapons, such as suicide drones, and the use of improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs), signalling a potential for deeper incursions into Israeli territory in the future, which already started to happen," he said.
According to Elijah Magnier, a military analyst who has covered conflicts in the Middle East for more than 30 years, the military confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel cannot be defined as "skirmishes" for at least three reasons.
Firstly, both Hezbollah and Israel have suffered losses. Secondly, the exchange of fire is taking place all along the 120-km border for the first time, and, lastly, Hezbollah is fighting on a territory controlled by Israel, imposing the rhythm of the fighting.
"The battle of Gaza almost hasn't started yet. So, we haven't seen the potentiality of the Palestinian resistance against the occupational forces that are operating in Gaza. We've seen only a few attacks from Israelis who immediately withdrew to one kilometre on Jabalia's front,” Magnier said.
“Therefore, there is no point for Hezbollah in anticipating and declaring war on Israel when the Palestinian groups are still very prepared for the Israeli invasion. The point is to wait for the result of the Israeli attack and how the Palestinians are going to behave."
Assessing casualties on both sides is challenging. Hezbollah reports nearly 60 fighters have been killed, and theysignificant damage to Israel, including 120 Israeli soldiers killed or wounded, nine tanks and troop carriers destroyed, and equipment like cameras, radar, and communication systems damaged. TNA, however, couldn't independently verify this information.
In his speech, Nasrallah stated that a third of the Israeli army is deployed near the border, along with naval and air forces. This information also lacks independent verification. As a precaution, civilians are evacuating, with Lebanese residents near Israel fleeing due to fears of potential conflict and Israeli civilians vacating from the northern Israeli border.
"To some extent, what Hezbollah has been doing for the past three weeks is to underline that they are ready to pay a price. But are they ready to pay the ultimate price? Nobody knows that because this is part of the constructive ambiguity mentioned by Nasrallah"
"Psychology is the major aspect here. The enemy has to be convinced that if he does certain things that you don't want him to do, he is going to pay a very high price. And for that purpose, you have to make it credible to the enemy that you're ready to inflict that price and sustain the response,” Heiko Wimmen, director of the International Crisis Group's Iraq, Syria, Lebanon project, told .
“To some extent, what Hezbollah has been doing for the past three weeks is to underline that they are ready to pay a price. But are they ready to pay the ultimate price? Nobody knows that because this is part of the constructive ambiguity mentioned by Nasrallah," he said.
This constructive ambiguity aims not only to destabilise Israel psychologically but also to reaffirm the unsaid rule of engagement and deterrence that has been established on both sides over the years. This consists of not involving the loss of civilians in the conflict on the border, which has already occurred and could lead to a potential escalation, as well as trying to maintain a certain level of proportionality in attacks.
Wimmen explained that as the exchange of fire on the border intensifies, it creates a self-sustaining dynamic. Israel is pushing deeper to keep Hezbollah away from the border, and Hezbollah responds with strikes deeper into Israeli territory, amplifying the conflict.
This could be seen as a response to more intense Israeli attacks in Gaza, but dynamics in southern Lebanon also have their own logic.
"If the Israelis were to target civilians, especially more than they have thus far, there's a possibility of returning to the pre-2000 logic of reciprocal civilian casualties, which carries a high potential for escalation. Hezbollah's strategy remains unchanged, but the situation indicates an increased risk of escalation compared to what it was about ten days ago," he said.
In the long-term, however, any escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border will likely be determined by the war on Gaza. Still, Magnier highlightsthat there are lots of misunderstandings about the expectations of Hezbollah's involvement in the conflict.
"Hezbollah is in the battle, and it's a controlled battle. So, it's still within certain parameters because the war hasn't really started yet in Gaza," he said.
There are several factors that Israel has to take into consideration in order to avoid triggering a Hezbollah response that could result in an escalation. One consists of large-scale massacres of civilians in Gaza, which have already occurred.
In military terms, one of the most significant factors would be Hamas clearly losing the battle, while a third factor is the nature of any large-scale Israeli army incursion into Gaza and its consequences.
"I don't see the Iranians sacrificing Hezbollah on the altar of Hamas. Hezbollah is much too important for them to want to fritter it away in a pointless full-scale war with Israel," Blandford said.
Hezbollah is Tehran's greatest export from the Islamic Revolution and a key component of Iran's deterrence architecture. From its perspective, anyone thinking of attacking Iran, whether targeting their nuclear facilities or attempting to destabilise the regime, must take into account Hezbollah's actions in Lebanon,the analyst added.
If a full-scale war were to develop, regardless of the outcome, Hezbollah would likely suffer significant losses, and there's no guarantee it could rebuild as rapidly as it did after the 2006 war, impacting its role as a deterrent for Iran.
"I don't see the Iranians sacrificing Hezbollah on the altar of Hamas. Hezbollah is much too important for them to want to fritter it away in a pointless full-scale war with Israel"
Hezbollah's strategy may result in miscalculation in the event that Israel itself decides to escalate the conflict in Lebanon's southern border, but all of the experts interviewed by TNA said that this scenario seems unlikely at the moment.
"I don't see any of them suddenly initiating the overall war. But if escalation occurs against Hamas, you get more tension on the border, and this is where you get some miscalculation," Macaron said.
Furthermore, a war in Lebanon would be disastrous for the population and counterproductive for Hezbollah, according to Michael Young, a political analyst and senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
"Israel might replicate in Lebanon, especially in Shia areas, what they did in Gaza, and there won't be anyone to rebuild Lebanon. If they bomb the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Shia villages in southern Lebanon as they're doing in Gaza today, it'll place a heavy burden on Hezbollah as hundreds of thousands of Shia residents would be displaced,” Young said.
“This could lead to strong reactions against Hezbollah, not only from other communities but also from the Shia community. Engaging in a war is not an option Hezbollah desires as it could transform the Lebanese landscape to their disadvantage."
But in terms of regional politics, the current involvement of Hezbollah may have some advantages for the group.
"The past years have seen tensions and conflicts between Shia and Sunnis in various regions, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Presenting Hezbollah as a champion for Sunni Palestinians, whether in Lebanon, Gaza, or the West Bank, could help mend sectarian divisions,” Salamey said.
“Hezbollah's image suffered due to its involvement in the Syrian war, supporting Shia groups against Sunni factions. Nevertheless, this conflict could serve as an opportunity to restore Hezbollah's reputation as liberators of Palestine."
Hezbollah's controlled involvement in the conflict also serves Iran's aim to consolidate and strengthen the use of the regional alliance, known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, to counterbalance Israel and the United States.
"Hezbollah's role in this alliance of forces is central in terms of reinforcing relations between the different groups in the axis of resistance. And basically, now Iran has a major weapon with which to defend its interest in the region,” Young said.
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights.
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