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In a move that shuffled all the cards, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in a hard-hitting televised speech on the evening of 17 August that his country would not hold further talks with Ethiopia unless it "recognises the sovereignty of Somalia," putting the future of Turkish mediation in jeopardy.

Turkey launched an initiative to reconcile two of its most important partners in East Africa in May following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Ankara.

Ties between the two countries soured earlier this year following a deal that saw the self-declared republic of Somaliland agree to lease part of its Red Sea coastline to its landlocked neighbour Ethiopia.

As part of the understanding, Addis Ababa recognised the region’s independence and plans to build a naval base on the land. Somalia considered the deal an infringement on its sovereignty.

In July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted his Somali and Ethiopian counterparts Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Taye Aske Selassie followed by a joint statement describing talks as .

A second round of indirect talks scheduled for early September in Ankara were then brought forward to August, raising expectations of major developments which in the end did not materialise on the ground.

In a press conference, Fidan said that this second round was “more comprehensive,” noting that there was “great convergence between the two parties on some basic principles,” and that the third round of talks would be held on 17 September.

Turkey in the Horn of Africa

Turkey’s choice to play the role of mediator is due to its solid relations with both parties to the conflict, with Ankara one of the prominent regional players in the Horn of Africa, which has high geostrategic importance.

Turkey has multifaceted interests in Ethiopia and is reportedly source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the African state after China.

According to the Turkish ambassador in Addis Ababa, there are around ��operating in Ethiopia across various sectors, notably construction, pharmaceuticals, and the food industry.

The East African country is also one of the largest buyers of Turkish drones and ammunition on the continent.

Somalia, meanwhile, is the backbone of Turkish influence in the region, as it hosts the largest Turkish military base abroad. Turkey has also been active in the strategically located country since 2011, and in February the two parties signed an economic defence agreement under which Ankara will help Somalia defend its territorial waters in exchange for economic benefits.

Turkish goals

Turkish efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia come in the context of Turkey's growing role as a regional and international mediator.

Some analysts suggest that Ankara's willingness to mediate in this geo-strategically sensitive region is part of a broader strategy to enhance its influence in Africa through soft power tools such as providing economic and diplomatic support and humanitarian aid.

Turkey's large investments in the two countries also seem to be a motivating factor for Ankara to prevent the deterioration of relations between them, as any looming war in the region could threaten Ankara’s interests.

According to Tunç Demirtas, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Mersin University, the current dispute has broader geopolitical impacts beyond the concerns of Somalia and Ethiopia, as it may affect Djibouti and the Red Sea Basin, and therefore Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.

Turkey seeks to maintain a balance against the potential disruption of geostrategic interests and the risks of allowing non-state armed actors and terrorist organisations to get involved in this process.

Moreover, Turkey’s initiative in this mediation is an attempt by Ankara to play a role in supporting and defending international law within the global order, given that the MoU signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not considered valid, Demirtas told ������.

A real test

The escalating dispute between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa represents a real test of Turkish diplomacy’s ability to bridge the gap between two states whose relations have historically been characterised by mutual hostility.

In this context, it was noticeable that Ankara used diplomacy at the highest level, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud and the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed directly, or via telephone conversations, to break the ice between the two parties.

However, these efforts have not yet succeeded in achieving a tangible improvement, with some analysts believing that only a cancellation of the MoU would entice Somalia to start negotiations.

AlShafie Abtidon, a researcher at the Somali Centre for Studies, told TNA that Mogadishu is demanding Addis Ababa not to militarise its economic ambitions and that developing a military base in the Red Sea would pose a security risk to regional countries wary of the rise of Ethiopian influence.

Instead, Somalia would “open its ports to Ethiopian trade as is the case in Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania,” Abtidon added.

However, given leaked reports that Ethiopia requested Turkish mediation, there are indications that Addis Ababa does not want the dispute to escalate.

According to Ibrahim Salih, a journalist focused on the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa aims to make Somalia and Turkey understand its need for a sea outlet based on its economic and security concerns.

Addis Ababa believes in the legitimacy of this demand, according to Salih, which reflects its growing economic development.

So far, following the second round of talks in August, says it expects the next round to result in a resolution that “reinforces its unity and sovereignty”, while Ethiopia has stressed its aspiration to achieve its in securing access to the sea through peaceful means.

Mediation prospects

Considering this complex reality, little information has emerged about the Turkish proposals.

The Turkish Foreign Minister has that tensions between the two countries could end with access to the sea for Ethiopia via Somalia, as long as it recognises its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Questions arise, however, about how to unravel the knot embodied by the contradictory positions reflected in the Red Sea MoU.

Salih says it will be difficult for the Ethiopian side to back down from the MoU, stressing that this will only happen on condition of ensuring alternatives that meet Addis Ababa's security and economic demands.

While the economic aspect could be achieved through an agreement with Somalia, it will be difficult for Mogadishu to agree to the military base that Ethiopia is demanding to secure its interests.

Turkish efforts, therefore, are still a long way from convincing the two parties to make concessions. Researcher AlShafie Abtidon says that Ethiopia’s desire to separate the MoU file from negotiations on sea access will lead to the failure of Turkish mediation “now and in the future”.

For his part, Demirtas points out that it must be acknowledged that there is no “magic wand” to solve problems of this complexity and depth, but this does not mean that efforts have failed “after two or three meetings”.

Furthermore, the two parties acceptance of diplomacy as a tool to overcome the crisis is in itself a success worthy of support in order to prevent the future possibility of armed conflict.

Abdolgader Mohamed Ali is an Eritrean journalist and researcher in African Affairs.

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