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Three scenarios presented themselves from the moment Yevgeny Prigozhin turned his Wagner mercenary troops backwards into Russian territory.

The first, albeit a weak possibility, was that Wagner would reach Moscow and topple Putin. The second was that the Russian army would crush the mutiny swiftly, and the third was a prolonged, but undecided in-fighting that would shake Russia from within and weaken Putin further.

None of these scenarios bore good news for the Kremlin.

In the midst of these speculations, however, a fourth scenario was cooked to avoid confrontation and bloodshed, according to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, and indeed it ended the 48-hour armed mutiny.

With Putin’s approval, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko mediated with Prigozhin to withdraw his troops back into Ukrainian territories, with Prigozhin relocating to Belarus and the criminal charges against him dropped.

Russia has dodged a dangerous bullet, perhaps the most dangerous since the collapse of the Soviet Union a third of a century ago. But even a dodged bullet ricochets, leaving traces and fragments.

Wagner’s mutiny revealed intrinsic problems within Moscow’s power infrastructure, despite Russian state television trying to play down the crisis as resolved due to Russian unity and maturity.

That did not do enough to salvage Putin’s usual aura of absolute control and infallibility. The developments caught the attention of world leaders.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken  remarked that the rebellion had revealed “cracks” in Putin’s authority and power. The EU, meanwhile, adopted a more cautious language, describing the event as an “internal Russian issue.”

As rebellious Wagner forces (estimated at roughly 8500, according to British intelligence sources) took control of Rostov-on-Don, resistance seems to have melted away.

The few attack helicopters that attempted to curb the Wagnerites were shot down, causing Russian to wonder about the whereabouts of fighters that could have bombed the advancing rebels into smithereens.

Most surreal of all were the showing some of the residents of Rostov cheering for Prigozhin’s troops.

The crisis has also revealed a worrying trajectory in the power of non-state actors, specifically private military companies.

Until recently, mercenaries mostly operated underground. And as fortune hunters, they were typically hired by rebel groups, weak governments, and even multinational corporations to do their bids in geopolitically hot zones.

The Wagner group has raised the profile for private armies in terms of reach and capabilities, becoming key players - and human rights violators - in conflicts like Syria, Libya, and most definitely, sub-Saharan Africa.

In the Middle and North Africa (MENA), Wagner has become almost synonymous with the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests and a tool in its transnational competition against the West. The group serves as an integral part of Russia’s military network across the region. 

It was in the MENA region where the group has honed its military skills and raised the global profile of private armies in terms of reach, potential, and influence. Of course, none of that was possible without a trail of political controversies and a series of human rights violations.

Wagner mercenaries fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Russian and Assad troops in Syria, a stronghold of Russia’s regional influence, even in fatal battles with US special forces and taking control of strategic regions including oil and gas fields.

In Libya, the group was deployed to assist warlord Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) as it attempted to overthrow the UN-recognised Tripoli government. Wagner's presence and military expertise is integral to Haftar’s control over the southern and eastern provinces. 

In Sudan, Wagner has close ties to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and has been accused of taking advantage of the country’s political instability to smuggle gold into the UAE.

It may be early to predict the repercussions of Wagner’s mutiny on MENA. The group may be perceived as a destabilising threat to the governments of the countries in which they operate, thus their involvement will be reduced. Rival groups may take advantage of this moment of weakness to try to expel the group. 

For others, however, the group’s swift advancement toward Moscow attests to its considerable capabilities and, as a result, could open up new realms of business for them. This could result in autonomous Wagner groups acting independent from Moscow, particularly in Africa. 

Wagner’s ability to challenge the Russian state, and Putin’s hesitancy to act swiftly, may inspire private corporations, and other non-state actors, to build their own armies to act as forces parallel to the state authority.

To avoid such a slippery slope, Moscow may try to subject Wagner to soft dissolution. In this case, the Kremlin may keep it as a tool - albeit under tighter control - for Russia’s foreign policy. Alternatively, a Wagner withdrawal from the MENA region could leave a power vacuum that weakens Putin’s hand in the region.

from British intelligence claim that Putin is now planning to absorb Wagner fighters into Russia’s armed forces and dismiss all top Wagner commanders.

Cracks have already spread into Russia’s realpolitik, and the chances of Moscow returning to the pre-mutiny state of affairs may seem weak in the short run.

This does not necessarily mean, as Zelenskyy’s mockingly, that the Russian leadership is vulnerable or, as others speculated, the unity of the Russian Federation is at a tipping point.

It simply means that Putin is faced with new challenges, not least in terms of restoring his ‘strongman image’ while keeping the momentum in Ukraine unchanged.

Failure to achieve such balance could escalate the war and, with it, trigger more ripples in the fragile international system. Neither scenario is ideal for Ukraine.

Dr Emad Moussa is a Palestinian-British researcher and writer specialising in the political psychology of intergroup and conflict dynamics, focusing on MENA with a special interest in Israel/Palestine. He has a background in human rights and journalism, and is currently a frequent contributor to multiple academic and media outlets, in addition to being a consultant for a US-based think tank.

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