In what has been a nightmarish decade for many throughout the region, the sudden and unexpected collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal Potemkinesque regime produced a moment of euphoria, particularly for his victims in Syria. The news of his demise provided a welcome break from the steady stream of atrocities that drowned us in a melancholic malaise. Suddenly, we saw a sliver of hope.
Nothing snaps Syrians out of this temporary bliss faster than bringing up the topic of federalism.
Federalism has become a dirty word in many Syrian activist and policy circles. While federalism is essentially the institutionalised decentralisation of authority to substate units, many see it as a pathway to the destruction of the state. It conjures up images of the Balkans in the 1990s and spurs conspiratorial narratives of Western attempts to divide the country. Indeed, such conspiracies may not be all that far-fetched.
Scepticism is also rooted in fears that a federalist formula that favours the US-backed Kurdish-dominated forces in the northeast will lead to significant autonomy, causing friction between the autonomous region and the rest of the state down the road.
Nevertheless, most of these discussions ignore the nuances of varied federal arrangements and eschew their benefits from the outset.
Given the resistance of most of the Syrian opposition’s supporters to any notion of federalism, why bring it up?
As Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, its allies, and its foes, sit down together to work on creating an institutional roadmap for Syria to present to its people, they will – or should – be looking to resolve three primary problems.
First, they will be walking a tightrope in trying to create a system that prevents threats from political elites from arising and destabilising the country while also preventing autocratisation during this precarious time.
Second, they are tasked with constructing a system of governance that must be responsive to the demands of a highly diverse population and set of communities.
Finally, they will need to experiment with different policy formulas and create incentives for political actors to produce policies that benefit their communities as they break away from a past policy framework structured around propping up a particular set of elites.
Is federalism the solution for Syria?
The instinctual reaction to such problems is to emphasise power-sharing at the national level. Ultimately, such power-sharing in the political arena will institutionalise sectarian and ethnic identities. This would exacerbate and reproduce the social divisions that the consociational system would ostensibly be trying to resolve.
A non-sectarian symmetric federation with significant decentralisation of social and economic policymaking duties that empowers local authorities, yet is paired with a coercively strong central government, is a preferable solution.
The creation of local power structures will offer local authority to those who are in a position to destroy the peace in the short run. This may disincentivise attempts to destabilise the state while limiting the power of the central authority.
Moreover, it does not require the institutionalisation of sectarian or ethnic identities and allows for local competition for power down the road to reduce the strength of elites tied to political apparatuses associated with certain sectarian or ethnic groups.
The Syrian social fabric and physical environment of Syria are heterogeneous in ways that extend well beyond sectarian and linguistic identities and are difficult to enumerate in a short piece. Different communities in Syria largely represented by the same sect can have vastly different value systems and needs. Such heterogeneity is accompanied by differences in social and economic norms that preceded the war and may have strengthened during it.
Subscribe Now and Listen to our Podcasts OnAt a more fundamental level, the physical environments that these communities are located in map onto different sets of suitable policies. What is good for Latakia may not be good for Deir Ezzor. Federalism would allow different regions to structure policies that are adaptive to their unique challenges.
Finally, the Syrian policy landscape will likely need to be revamped. The decentralisation of authority to substate actors increases the accountability of politicians to local audiences and allows regions to experiment with different sets of policies without threatening the whole of Syria. Policies that succeed in certain regions may diffuse to other regions if they are suitable for their environments.
Moreover, competition in the policy domain may create incentives for politicians to produce favourable conditions to draw in investment and attract talent.
The starting point for negotiating a federalist framework should not be any of the plans that have already been drawn up by AANES or other parties.
Developing a plan for a federalist Syria should begin with the current Syrian administrative divisions, which are familiar and can be modified so that they are responsible to their region’s residents rather than a national authority whose perspectives may be distant from the needs of particular communities.
To be clear, I do not believe that a federalist formula is either a necessary or sufficient condition for Syria to prosper in the future.
Nor do I believe that all forms of federalism can be good for Syria. If the substate units that are created are provided with pathways to secession, significant coercive capacity, or too much economic autonomy, the result could be disastrous.
Nevertheless, a federalist Syria with a strong central government and substate units that preside over social and local economic policies can partially address some of the most pressing challenges in Syria’s post-Assad period.
Ammar Shamaileh is an Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, and is an Associate Editor at Middle East Law & Governance. His work primarily focuses on the political economy of Syria, non-democratic ruling networks, and preference falsification in authoritarian contexts. This work has appeared in Comparative Politics, Political Science Research and Methods, Political Research Quarterly, and Omran, among other venues. He is also the author of (Routledge) and the co-author of (Indiana University Press).
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