It is over a month since clashes erupted between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), leading to severe losses and further destabilising a politically fragile and insecure region which has long been the focus of global competition for external strategic interests.
Sudan lies in a deeply unstable region, bordering seven countries most of which are mired in grinding internal conflicts themselves. To the west is Ethiopia which is just emerging from the crushing Tigray war, which led to half a million deaths and left hundreds of thousands homeless – many of whom flocked across the Sudanese border.
To the south lies South Sudan, which has been wracked by civil war since its independence in 2011 - Khartoum is host to 800,000 South Sudanese refugees. Also to the south, is the Central African Republic (CAR), where a violent power struggle has been playing out for nearly ten years, in addition to the country being the focus of feverish Russian-French competition for influence. North-west lies Libya which has been flooding its neighbours with illicitly trafficked weapons since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
For Sudan's northern neighbour, Egypt, with which it shares extensive land and sea borders, the war is presenting acute security-linked and economic challenges. Moreover, four million Sudanese citizens live in Egypt. The war also threatens to weaken Cairo’s position in negotiations around the dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – Egypt has relied on Sudan's support to form a united front in the negotiations.
To the west is impoverished, conflict-ridden Chad which shares a 1,403km border with Sudan.
And then there is another hidden factor intensifying the complexity of the regional situation: Sudan, with its long history of bloody civil wars, shares overlapping armed rebel movements and opposition factions with its neighbours. This is due to the interrelation of numerous ethnic groups across various borders which has acted to draw in elements from its neighbours.
For example, most of the rebel movements which have fought successive governments in Chad have based themselves in and operated from Darfur in Sudan, due to ethnic and clan-based ties which bridge the recognised border.
Furthermore, several opposition movements in this region are linked through alliances like the RSF's alliance with Khalifa Haftar in Libya, or the alliance of some Chadian opposition factions with armed groups in Libya.
These conditions are likely to lead to proliferating security challenges in the region.
On another front, Sudan is considered a source and transit state for illegal migration. The current conflict is escalating this trend, with human smuggling networks active and empowered in light of the ongoing fragility of the security situation of the transit states, which also include Libya and Tunisia.
Conversely, Sudan has also been a refuge for many. Estimates put those illegally resident in the country from Sudan's neighbours at over ten million. However, these states are currently seeing a mass exodus from Sudan, with tens of thousands fleeing during the first days of the war, from Sudan into Egypt, Chad, and South Sudan.
Sudan's strategic position on the Red Sea presents yet another source of anxiety - fears are rising due to the existence of uninhabited areas in east Sudan, which could lead to serious security breaches in the event the war drags on. Additionally, piracy could appear on off the Red Sea coasts, similarly to that which escalated off the coasts of Somalia between 2007-2011.
This is the backdrop to the current outbreak of violence - a fragile region fraught with thorny issues - in which the two warring parties are desperate to resolve their disputes down the barrel of a gun.
Meanwhile there has been an absence of explicit or serious international positions being taken on Sudan's crisis with the exception of the traditional diplomatic stance of calling for a ceasefire and a peaceful reconciliation between the two sides. At the same time, regional axes with conflicting interests are crystallising and expressing their support for one side or the other, opening the way for the two generals to seek assistance from external parties, which will transform the Sudanese situation into a proxy war.
The severity of the situation means the international community has a greater responsibility than ever. The war has proven it was a fatal and naïve mistake to believe something resembling democracy could emerge in Sudan while the country was in the grip of the two rival generals.
It is now up to the international community to intervene immediately to prevent the slide into a protracted civil war which will have dire repercussions for the region. The scenario of Sudan's disintegration wouldn’t just be a disaster for the survival of the Sudanese state, but would have devastating repercussions in the Sahel, the Sahara, the Red Sea, as well as the Horn of Africa, and will increase the chaos wracking this already inflamed region to a disastrous degree.
The government-arranged evacuation of their citizens by air, land and sea and the closure of foreign embassies as well as the exit of diplomats and UN staff on private planes and buses, has made it clear that the Sudanese have been left well and truly alone to deal with this crisis.
Maybe we are seeing echoes of what unfolded in Somalia in the nineties, when Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Muhammad vied for power after the tyrannical regime of Siad Barre was toppled. The result was the disintegration of the country, which slid into the mire of civil war – with the ramifications still deeply present today: Somalia has become a nexus of foreign intervention by multiple states and subject to their interests.
It appears as though this tragic history could be repeating itself in Sudan due to the obsession with control held by two power-crazed generals.
Suhaib Mahamoud is a Somali writer and researcher based in Doha, Qatar. He writes for Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, °®Âþµº's Arabic-language sister publication.
This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition. To read the original click Translated by Rose Chacko
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