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Since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah, or 'Partisans of God') has emerged as one of the most active and capable members of Iran's so-called 'Axis of Resistance' - an alliance built over years of Iranian support to counter Israeli and US influence in the Middle East.

Over the past year, the Yemeni group has intensified threats to global naval trade by attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb while defying US-led efforts to neutralise its arsenal.

Despite growing ties with Tehran and alignment with other members of the Axis, the Houthis remain the most autonomous entity in Iran's network. They have distinct regional ambitions, forging new partnerships beyond the Middle East.

According to Eleonora Ardemagni, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Houthis' primary aim is to strengthen their decision-making autonomy and influence, both within the Axis and beyond.

“The Houthis are building their own 'network of resistance',” she told ������, highlighting alliances with Shia militias in Iraq, Somalia’s Al-Shabab, and even al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

While complementary to the Axis, these cross-regional connections enhance the Houthis’ capacity to pressure international shipping and increase leverage in ceasefire negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

Moscow's calculated engagement

Thanks to the threat they pose to navigation shipping routes, the Houthis' rising prominence has attracted international actors, including Russia, seeking to challenge the Western-dominated political and economic order. Moscow’s ties with the Yemeni group have grown alongside its military partnership with Iran and its Axis.

"The Houthis' rising contacts with Russia underline how the Yemeni group is working to diversify its alliances, also beyond Iranian-led 'Resistance'," Ardemagni adds. "From the Houthis' perspective, Russia fits into this scheme to acquire new partners for weapons, smuggling routes, and finances."

While Moscow officially maintains a neutral stance in Yemen's conflict, its interactions with the Houthis have grown significantly, especially since the outbreak of the Gaza war in the context of Ansar Allah's strategic operations in the Red Sea. In 2024, Houthi delegations visited Moscow twice to meet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, with additional meetings in Oman last July.

In the same month, US intelligence Russia deployed GRU military advisors to Houthi-controlled regions in Yemen. These are believed to have been operating in the country "for months," providing weaponry training, identifying commercial targets for anti-Western operations, and potentially to enhance the Houthis' ability to attack commercial vessels.

"As Russia seeks to retaliate for the US permitting the use of long-range missiles by Ukraine against it, assisting the Houthis in keeping the US snarled up militarily and financially in the Red Sea may well seem like an attractive option," says Dr Elisabeth Kendall, mistress (head) of Girton College at Cambridge University.

A potentially escalating threat

Reports suggest Moscow has considered supplying the Houthis with small arms like and advanced (ASCM) P-800 Yakhont/Oniks. If introduced, this advanced system - far surpassing the Houthis' current arsenal of Iranian-supplied missiles - would significantly enhance their threat to merchant shipping and Western naval vessels operating in the region, including Operation Prosperity Guardian, , and Atalanta.

These developments highlight a deepening Russia-Houthi collaboration, potentially escalating regional tensions and threatening international maritime trade. “Any Russian transfer of weapons or intelligence to the Houthis would be a significant escalation,” Kendall warns.

“It would not only defy international efforts to contain the Houthi threat but unambiguously signal Russia's intent to act as a spoiler to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, with all of the economic fallout that entails.”

To date, Moscow seems to have refrained from such transfers, likely due to pressure from Saudi Arabia, but nonetheless raising alarm in the United States.

Additionally, have surfaced that Houthi recruits have been trafficked into fighting in Ukraine under false promises of lucrative jobs and eventual Russian citizenship. Although such claims align with Moscow's broader efforts to mitigate heavy losses in its ongoing war with Kyiv by enlisting migrants and foreign nationals - mainly North Koreans - they are still unverified, warranting caution.

Houthis' ambitions pass through Moscow

For the Houthis, closer ties with Moscow will bring international recognition and new sources of military and intelligence support beyond Iran's capabilities while further boosting their regional standing. This growing relationship also reflects shifts within the Axis of Resistance itself.

Ansar Allah, though geographically far from Israel, has assumed a larger role in the Axis by targeting international shipping and pressuring Israel during the Gaza war, but also because of their expanding arsenals and growing offensive capabilities.

In contrast, Hamas and Hezbollah have weakened amidst ongoing confrontation with Israel. "The Houthis aspire to take on a greater leadership role within - and beyond - the Axis of Resistance,” Kendall notes. “For them, working with Russia provides status and recognition, not just weapons and data.”

This partnership with Moscow complements Iran’s objectives, reinforcing shared anti-Western sentiment without undermining Houthi-Iran ties. “The Houthis’ diversification of alliances is unlikely to create friction with Iran, particularly given the strengthening Iran-Russia defence partnership,” Ardemagni says.

Saudi Arabia: Between the hammer and the anvil?

Beyond its anti-Western dimension, Moscow’s involvement in Yemen could also serve as a strategic effort to gain leverage over Saudi Arabia. With Riyadh negotiating a potential defence treaty with the United States, Russia may be positioning itself as a spoiler, especially in anticipation of an incoming second Trump administration, where the Kingdom might adopt a more pro-American stance on oil prices in exchange for security guarantees.

Washington could pressure Saudi Arabia to use its influence with Moscow to block weapons and intelligence transfers to the Houthis. However, Trump’s focus will likely centre on curbing Riyadh's growing ties to Russia (and China).

In any case, prolonging the Red Sea conflict risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, deterring foreign investment, and disrupting tourism in the area - key pillars of the Kingdom’s development strategy. Thus, Riyadh risks losing the most from any escalation in the area, making it a critical player balancing tensions around the Houthis and Russia.

As the Houthis’ regional ambitions grow, disentangling Yemen’s conflict from broader Middle East crises will become increasingly difficult.

“Despite the clear desire of international and regional actors to compartmentalise conflicts across continents, there is a real risk that they could merge and spiral out of control,” warns Kendall.

Developing a Houthi-driven network in the Red Sea region could further introduce new destabilising dynamics to an already fragile geopolitical landscape in the medium to long term.

The Houthis’ diplomatic engagements with Russia and China hint at a more autonomous - but not pro-Western - foreign policy in the future. “At the moment, emerging Houthi-Russia relations should not be overstated, but they require careful monitoring,” concludes Ardemagni.

“In the medium to long term, these ties could create friction between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Russia while potentially triggering renewed US activism regarding Yemen and the Red Sea.”

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors

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