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The foothills in northern Tehran are crowded on weekends, with the youth escaping to nature to enjoy a few hours of freedom from strict sharia laws in the Iranian capital. But during the weekdays, the slopes connecting the Tochal recreational complex to a ski resort of the same name only host mountaineers and occasionally, during evenings of such days, Mohammad Shamkhani, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) two-star general, could be seen hiking along the foothills.

Two bodyguards escort him, one from behind and one in the front. While hiking in the mountains adjacent to the Tochal complex, all three wear civilian clothes and sneakers. However, their civilian clothes look very military: Khaki pants and untucked grey double-pocket shirts. The bodyguards constantly talk over walkie-talkies with other unseen security members, and the shape of handguns is visible under their shirts.

The Tochal complex, where Shamkhani spends some of his weekday afternoons, was built by the dictatorial regime of the Shah, whom Shamnkhani fought by establishing an Islamist group called Mansooroon.Ìý

The steps that Shamkhani takes along these steep hills leading to the recreational complex are very similar to the steps he has been taking in Iran's political scene during the past 44 years: slow, well-thought and secure. This explains why instead of Iran's president or foreign minister, it was Shamkhani who was sent to China on 10 March to ink aÌýreconciliation dealÌýwith Iran's regional rival Saudi Arabia.Ìý

Immediately after China, he, as the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, travelled to the United Arab Emirates and Iraq to improve Iran's regional political relations and secure economic ties with Baghdad.Ìý

Two months earlier, whenÌýAlireza Akbari, one of Shamkahni's former deputies, was executed based on espionage accusations, this powerful IRGC commander's position seemed very insecure. But his return to the forefront of Iran's politics was quick, demonstrating the strong ties he has created with crucial economic and political players in Iran.Ìý Ìý

An Iranian Arab with military power

Shamkhani was born in Ahwaz, the capital of the oil-rich Khuzestan province, in a family from a minority group of Iranian Arabs. Unlike millions of Iranians from various minority groups who are systematically deprived of reaching high-ranking military and political positions, he was able to manoeuvre his way to the highest positions in Iran's politics and armed forces.Ìý

Moreover, despite the country's troubled economy, he created a wealthy family economic empire. Even with the revelation of several corruption cases related to his sons, son-in-law and nephews, his family have remained one of the untouchables in the country's political system.

After the 1979 revolution, Shamkani climbed the ladder up into the circle of powerful militaries rapidly thanks to his ties with powerful commanders in the newly established Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Immediately after the IRGC's establishment in May 1979, he joined its KhuzestanÌýbranch and was soon appointed as the provincial commander of the IRGC. Khuzestan became a key province in Iran when Iraq's army attacked in September 1980 and began the longest conventional war of the 20th century.

In 1981, the 26-year-old provincial commander of the IRGC was promoted to deputy commander of the elite forces, where he remained until 1988. At the same time, between 1985 and 1988, he was the commander of IRGC ground forces and, for one year, the minister of the Revolutionary Guards.

A few months after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989, it came time to distribute new high-ranking military posts among the IRGC commanders who survived. Back then, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had just claimed the position of the new supreme leader in Iran and urgently needed people loyal to him in control of the country's military forces.

That is how Shamkhani, without any experience in the navy, was given the commodore rank by Khamenei and appointed as the commander of Iran's official army, Artesh, navy forces. A few months later, he was additionally appointed as the commander of the IRGC navy force and dramatically increased the pace of developing the IRGC squadron of speedboats in the Persian Gulf.ÌýÌý

IRGC commander gains political influence

Shamkhani's presence in non-military posts began with the emergence of reformists in Iran's political scene.

In 1997, when the reformist Mohammad Khatami won the presidential elections in a surprise victory, Shamkhani once again came to assist Khamenei, whose power was challenged by the reformists. With the Supreme Leader's recommendation, he was appointed as the minister of defence in the cabinet.Ìý

After the end of Khatami's first term in office, in a rare move, Shamkhani, without resigning from his position at the ministry of defence, registered for the 2001 presidential elections. With Khatami's national support during this period, his defence minister won only 2.62 per cent of the votes. But thanks to his affiliations with the Supreme Leader and ties to some reformist factions, the IRGC commander secured the highest post in the ministry of defence for another four-year term.

The only period in the post-revolution Iran that Shamkhani had no executive position was during the eight years when hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in power. However, the Supreme Leader appointed his long-term trusty as the Center of Strategic Defence Research member in those years.Ìý

With the end of the Ahmadinejad era in Iran's politics, Shamkhani returned to power and, since 2013, has served as the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. This powerful body is responsible for all the country's major military and security decisions.

However, his recent presence in Iran's foreign policy opened a new chapter in Shamkhani's political life. The only Iranian who has ever received the Order of Abdulaziz Al Saud from Saudi Arabia's former king Fahad is implementing new diplomacy in the region. His success is a distinct contrast to the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi's failure to solve Iran's major regional issues.