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Libya's shaky status quo is beginning to show cracks, with the looming threat of violence beginning to rupture its fragile cold peace.

Earlier this year, the United Nations special envoy to Libya at the time, Abdoulaye Bathily, sounded the alarm to the Security Council, warning that the country is teetering on the brink of “disintegration”.

Those gloomy predictions now appear to be drawing closer. On 9 August, at least nine people were killed and 17 injured in clashes in Tajoura, an eastern suburb of Tripoli, Libya’s capital city. Local media suggested that these clashes may have been sparked by an assassination attempt on a militia leader.

The next day, militia clashes briefly occurred in the Qali Bulla area, east of Tajoura. It comes after clashes also occurred in Tajoura in July, reportedly resulting in three deaths.

These incidents mark an alarming escalation in a country that has experienced relative calm since a UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020, following a war the previous year for control of Tripoli.

Following those clashes, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) over the unfolding events, stating that it is closely monitoring the "recent mobilisation of forces in various parts of Libya".

UNSMIL also urged "all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any provocative military actions that could be perceived as offensive”. Analysts are increasingly wary that the risk of further violence is growing.

Libya's worsening tensions

Tensions have continued around the south of Libya. In the past week, forces loyal to eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar, who leads the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), deployed to the Ghadames region near the Algerian border, reportedly aiming to seize control of the region’s strategic airport.

Given these areas are under the control of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Haftar’s attempts to expand his influence in western Libya have effectively violated the UN-brokered ceasefire.

Although that excursion didn’t lead to major gains for Haftar, and further violence has thus far been avoided, analysts have warned that the risk of conflict still lingers.

“This recent outbreak of violence and divisions shows that the instability in Libya is reaching a dangerous phase. And this is a similar scenario to what we faced in 2019 before the war in Tripoli began,” Tarek Megerisi, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told ������.

He further noted that "different factions believe they have an opportunity to gain more power. We are witnessing a breakdown at every level now, especially politically and militarily".

Amid the risk of escalation, there have been repeated quarrels and disputes between the governments in the west and east, further highlighting that the prospect of unifying Libya is more distant than it has been in years.

Corruption within the system

Following the 2011 ousting of Muammar Gaddafi after the Arab Spring uprising and the NATO intervention, Libya has been in turmoil. Efforts by the UN and NATO countries to unify Libya, promote elections, and bridge internal divides that emerged after 2011 have failed.

Since 2014, the country has been divided between rival governments in the west and east. Tripoli, in the west, is home to the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), while the eastern region is largely controlled by the House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk, which supports the Government of National Stability (GNS) under Khalifa Haftar’s influence and formed in March 2022.

Steps to implement a political solution since the 2020 ceasefire have achieved limited success. Elections that were originally due in December 2021 were delayed over various factors, such as logistics, disputes over election laws, and security concerns.

Due to weak domestic institutions and a fragile security system, entrenched corruption and infighting among the country's political and military factions have also silenced the voices of ordinary Libyans.

“The post-Gaddafi ruling class - military, political and economic actors - continue to prioritise their monopoly on power over the demands of the Libyan people to end the long transitional period,” Stephanie Williams, former special adviser on Libya to the United Nations secretary-general, told ������.

“There is not a single institution that enjoys a shred of popular legitimacy; all have long exceeded their shelf life.”

Even amid the relative calm, infighting has impacted mainstream institutions. For instance, the CEO of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), Farhat Bengdara, is a Haftar ally who was appointed controversially in 2022 after his forces blockaded or threatened to blockade oil fields.

Haftar’s forces, particularly led by his son Saddam, have pressured oil fields such as Al-Sharara on multiple occasions, aiming to ensure more oil revenues are diverted from Tripoli to the Sirte-based government.

However, that also risks the recovery of Libya’s oil sector, which constitutes around 98 percent of government revenues and 60 percent of its GDP. Further violence will therefore have profound risks for Libya’s post-war economic recovery, too.

Militias, whether aligned with Haftar or independent, have often targeted key institutions. On 18 August, the Central Bank of Libya said it was "suspending all operations" after a bank official was abducted in the capital Tripoli, showing the implications for other vital sectors.

“This fragile peace that everyone was content with, based on both sides sharing oil revenues and making deals around the oil sector, is showing signs of cracking,” Claudia Gazzini, a Libya analyst at the International Crisis Group, told TNA.

The role of foreign powers

Ultimately, the role of foreign powers will be key in determining the country’s direction, even if external intervention played a notable part in exacerbating the country’s divisions during the last civil conflict.

While the UAE, Russia, France, and Egypt initially aligned with Haftar’s forces in 2019, to varying degrees, Turkey's intervention in support of the Tripoli-based government in 2020 helped crush Haftar’s ambitions and paved the way to brokering a ceasefire.

Paradoxically, while foreign powers fuelled Libya’s violence following Gaddafi’s demise, they are arguably now keeping the country from descending into chaos.

"As long as foreign powers do not support war, which is unlikely due to the volatility of the region, then things could just continue as they are,” Claudia Gazzini noted.

Even if a war doesn’t break out, “we might be entering a new phase of political chaos in Libya,” she added.

The prospect of renewed violence has certainly alarmed some neighbours.

Algeria has expressed concern over the potential outbreak of violence on its own border. Per its traditional approach of not picking sides in Libya, Algeria has aligned itself with the UN’s position and called for “the opposing brothers” to stop any further clashes.

In trying to spearhead the European Union’s engagement with Libya, Italy has pursued its Mattei Plan to gain more influence and oil and gas deals in Africa. The architect of this, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, has tried to court both major camps in Libya.

Yet, despite Italy’s consistent diplomatic engagements and gas deals within Libya, including an $8bn deal in January 2023 and subsequent cooperation agreements, Rome has had limited success in bridging Libya’s divide.   

While Egypt could have leveraged its influence in the east to help broker a political solution, this possibility may have been undermined when Egypt extended an invitation to Usama Hammad on 11 August, the Benghazi-based prime minister of the GNS, who accepted the invitation and visited Cairo.

That caused a rift with the GNU’s Presidential Council, which subsequently expelled Egypt’s diplomatic mission. It has hindered what analysts previously considered as an opportunity for Egypt and Turkey to broker a lasting agreement, given Ankara’s own influence in the West and ties with the Tripoli government.

In the absence of a political deal between western and eastern Libya, Moscow’s mercenaries have been able to retain a presence in the east, aligning with Sirte’s GNS.

While further violence may occur, it may not necessarily lead to a full-scale war of the same magnitude as previous conflicts. Indeed, the international powers that once backed Haftar are now more hesitant given his failures and their own lack of appetite for renewed conflict.

However, the situation remains fluid, and the risk of increased clashes is growing. Even if a hot war is averted, the latest violence and tensions show that the current state of affairs is untenable, with a need for more direct diplomacy to avoid escalating instability.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

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