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It has only been a month since President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime fell to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led rebel coalition. Yet, there are already some important indicators of how the ‘New Syria’ might conduct its foreign policy and reposition Damascus geopolitically.

Since being appointed late last year, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani made his first official trip of the post-Assad era to Saudi Arabia, arriving in Riyadh on New Year’s Day.

Then, Damascus’s new chief diplomat visited Qatar on 5 January - one day before he went to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). That the first three countries visited by Shaibani since taking office were all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members speaks to the Gulf’s importance to Syria’s HTS-led government.

Following weeks of Riyadh-HTS engagement, Shaibani made his maiden trip to Saudi Arabia on 1 January and his hope that a “new, bright page” can open in Syria’s relationship with the Kingdom. Syria’s Minister of Defence Murhaf Abu Qasra and the Head of the General Intelligence Service Anas Khattab accompanied Damascus’s chief diplomat.

With Syria’s new foreign minister visiting Saudi Arabia before any other country, the HTS-led government sent out a message loud and clear about the extent to which Damascus sees Saudi Arabia playing a key role in Syria’s post-Baathist future. While in Doha four days later, Shaibani met with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani. In the Qatari capital, Syria’s top diplomat called on the US to lift sanctions on Syria - a call made by the Gulf Arab states and Turkey following Assad’s fall on 8 December.

While blasting Washington’s sanctions as a “barrier and an obstacle to the rapid recovery” of Syria’s economy, Shaibani , “We conveyed to Doha our concerns about the challenges related to the economic sanctions imposed on the Syrian people”. Sheikh Mohammed, for his part, Qatar’s support for “Syria's unity, sovereignty, and independence”.

The Syrian foreign minister arrived in Abu Dhabi on 6 January and with the UAE’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (ABZ), whose direct communication with Shaibani began on 23 December.

While in Abu Dhabi, Damascus’s chief diplomat and his Emirati counterpart  developments that have unfolded in Syria following Assad’s ouster and the “brotherly” relations between Syria and the UAE. ABZ stressed Abu Dhabi’s firm support for Syria’s independence and sovereignty.

The Gulf has much to offer the 'New Syria'

What the new leadership in Damascus currently wants above all else is foreign direct investment in the shattered Syrian economy and for the country’s HTS-led government to gain as much international legitimacy as possible. Key stumbling blocks are the West’s economic sanctions on post-Assad Syria and the fact that the UN, the US, and other Western governments still designate HTS as a terrorist organisation.

The GCC states, especially the three which Shaibani has visited this month, will play critical roles in helping Syria’s new rulers in their efforts to achieve these goals. The deep-pocketed Gulf Arab monarchies with their close ties to the West and networks in Syria are uniquely positioned to play bridging roles between Damascus, on one side, and Washington, London, and European Union (EU) members, on the other.

US President-elect Donald Trump is notoriously unpredictable, making it difficult to boldly forecast how his incoming administration will approach post-Assad Syria. There are so many unknown factors to consider. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will have much influence over Trump and those on his team. At least that was the case during his first term.

Looking ahead, if the current Syrian government can convince Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that it will serve their interests to have the HTS-led administration’s back in the US, it is reasonable to believe that the Saudis, Emiratis, and their lobbies in Washington can push Team Trump 2.0 to (at least partly) lift the Caesar Act sanctions on Syria and de-list HTS.

Qutaiba Idlbi, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, told ������ that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey will play important roles in the second Trump administration’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the ‘New Syria’ and that the HTS-led government in Damascus “understands that very well”.

He believes that “part of HTS’s approach is making sure there is a clear line of communications with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi [to secure] their support to lift sanctions [and] to get US support for the new administration in Syria”.

In a TNA interview, Dr Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King's College London, addressed what GCC members can do for the de facto Syrian ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa and his government.

“Obviously the Gulf states have quite a lot of lobbying power and if they were to put their weight behind the new Syrian government, this will count toward a lot as the US is transitioning to a new administration,” he explained.

“Everyone agrees that the Gulf is going to be the most pivotal part of the world in the transition in Syria. [GCC states] will be pivotal in that transition because they will provide the money and the backing,” added Dr Krieg.

“Even from a [Western] point of view, we know we don’t really have a foot in the door in Syria. Even the US’s foot on the ground is very weak. [Western states] require the Gulf [monarchies] as force multipliers. HTS knows that they need to engage the Gulf states as the intermediary, if you will, between the West and themselves.”

GCC states' interests

While Sharaa’s government will look to GCC members for investment and help in securing greater international legitimacy, the Gulf Arab monarchies are not charity organisations. Naturally, GCC states’ policies in relation to post-Assad Syria will be based on their own perceived national interests.

To be sure, all Gulf Arab monarchies share much common cause in Syria - primarily stability, preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity, and the prevention of power vacuums that can give new life to the Islamic State (IS).

Also, no one in the Gulf wants to see the eruption of new conflicts in Syria which can destabilise other parts of the Middle East. At the same time, one must not forget that the GCC members are six independent countries with foreign policies that do not always align.

“An important question is whether the Gulf states will work together to support Syria's new transitional government and its economic recovery, despite reservations about HTS and [Sharaa]. Syria could be a site of cooperation, or competition, among the Gulf states, as each one has different threat perceptions about Syria's new government and ties to different groups on the ground,” Anna Jacobs, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), told TNA.

“But even in the early days of Assad's ouster, officials from all of the Gulf states engaged directly with the new Syrian authorities, signalling early consensus on engagement.”

Irrespective of whether the ‘New Syria’ will over time become more a source of cooperation or competition among the GCC states, each Gulf Arab monarchy will have different types of influence vis-à-vis Syria’s transition and unique perspectives on the post-Assad government, while the various GCC members will have differing roles in Syria’s future.

From the standpoint of ideology and soft-power influence, Qatar seems to have the most potential to play a meaningful role in post-Assad Syria. Doha’s record in Syria helps explain why this is the case. Earlier on in the Syrian crisis, Qatar gave massive amounts of support to various rebel groups fighting the Assad regime. Doha has stood out in the Arab League for having refused to join the Syrian normalisation trend in the 2018-23 period. Since 2011, Qatar-based media networks such as Al Jazeera have also been important in terms of giving platforms to the Syrian opposition.

Nonetheless, Qatar appears set on playing it safe and allowing Saudi Arabia to drive Gulf Arab engagement with the HTS-led Syrian government. This has to do with Doha’s concerns about the possible risks of being perceived as bearing responsibility for problems that could arise in Syria’s post-Assad period.

Officials in the interim Damascus government are “probably more strongly aligned with Qatar’s vision for Syria in general. But the Qataris are quite hesitant to take a lead in Syria. At least they don’t want to be seen as owning the transition,” noted Dr Krieg.

“Hence, the Qataris are quite happy for the Saudis to take a Gulf lead in this transition because the Qataris don’t want to own the entire burden of that transition process when it goes wrong as it did in 2013, when the Qataris felt they were kind of abandoned by the United States,” he added.

Of the six GCC states, the UAE will likely have the most complicated, and potentially problematic, relationship with Syria’s HTS-led government. Given Abu Dhabi’s rigid opposition to Islamist and jihadist organisations and causes, as well as the extent to which the Emiratis invested in the Assad regime’s rehabilitation, it is easy to understand why the UAE, of all GCC members, had the most to lose from Assad’s fall late last year.

An underlying fear on Abu Dhabi’s part is that a successful Islamist revolution in the Arab world can set a precedent that inspires other Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa - a terrifying prospect from the perspective of the UAE’s leadership, which sees political Islam as an “existential threat”.

Jacobs explained that, of all Gulf Arab capitals, Abu Dhabi is “likely the most cautious” toward post-Assad Syria’s new authorities because of its “concerns about Islamist groups running any government in the region”. Yet, she sees the UAE’s decision to host the new Syrian foreign minister as an “early positive sign”. According to Jacobs, “the hope from the Syrian side is that Shaibani's visit to Abu Dhabi leads to humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as discussions on reconstruction support”.

Despite the lack of trust between HTS and Abu Dhabi, the two sides realise the importance of engaging the other. Noting that “beggars can’t be choosers,” Dr Krieg made the point that Syria’s de facto government is not in a position to turn down Emirati investment and other forms of support that could come later.

Therefore, the HTS-led administration in Damascus will likely approach Abu Dhabi pragmatically and try to lure Emirati investment while attempting to “bring the Emiratis around to, at least passively, back the new transition”. As Dr Krieg maintains, this will be necessary to decrease the chances of the UAE playing a “spoiler” role in post-Assad Syria.

Pointing to Abu Dhabi’s support for Libya’s Khalifa Haftar, Sudan’s Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. ‘Hemedti’), or Yemen’s Aidarous al-Zubaidi, he explained that the UAE has been a “spoiler” in other Arab revolutions and transitions, which is the last thing that HTS will want Abu Dhabi trying to pull off in Syria.

“With everything that Abu Dhabi has said so far and with how they’ve acted - when it came to the revolution and bringing in Assad from the cold - the UAE has a difficult standing in Syria. But you don’t want to lose Abu Dhabi, and I think that’s, strategically speaking, a very good realisation by HTS. They understand they need to have the Emiratis on their side because if they become spoilers, it will become very difficult. Obviously, many alternative warlords in Syria could potentially be backed,” Dr Krieg told TNA.

All GCC states clearly see engagement with HTS as necessary. The negative outcomes that could result from not engaging Syria’s new government are ones the Gulf Arab leaders seek to avoid. Giving officials in Sharaa’s administration a “chance to prove their bona fides” and seeking to establish the “strongest relations possible” with the current Damascus administration is the “most important” priority for GCC members at this point, explains Dr Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at AGSIW.

Such logic also applied to how most GCC members worked to rehabilitate Assad after intervention by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah seemingly secured the regime a victory, or at least led to a freezing of the conflict, until late last year.

“These countries have ongoing interests in Syria but no presence on the ground either directly or through armed proxies that can represent their concerns. So, they have two choices: engage with whoever is in power in Damascus or walk away from Syria altogether,” he explained.

“The second option is essentially preposterous, so these countries are liable to try to do business with whoever is in power in Syria, no matter what reservations they may have. This applies to the new Islamist rulers just as much as it applied to the Baathist authoritarians.”

Countless unknown factors surround the HTS-led government in Damascus and how it will act toward the rest of the Arab world. “Nobody knows what the attitude of the new power centre in Syria is going to be towards the region, whether it will be the source of a renewed impetus for self-styled jihadist revolutionaries in the region, serve as a front for Turkish hegemony, or otherwise prove a malignant power; or whether it will be essentially a reasonable and constructive force,” Dr Ibish told TNA.

In the interest of ensuring the latter scenario, GCC states have decided to robustly engage Sharaa’s government in ways that can potentially incentivise the HTS-led administration in Damascus to be a constructive force in the Middle East from the perspective of Gulf Arab states. Put simply, as Dr Ibish said, engagement at this point is a “no-brainer”.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

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