A coalition of Syrian rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an unprecedented 12-day offensive that on 8 December put an end to Bashar Al-Assad’s 24-year rule in Syria.
Launched on 27 November, the ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ operation rapidly seized significant portions of northern and southern Syria, facing little to no resistance from the Syrian army.
Rebels took control of strategic highways, military assets, and key cities such as Aleppo, Hama, Daraa, and Homs, ultimately reaching the capital Damascus, where they announced the end of the Assad regime in a historic turning point for Syria.
Hours later, media reports said Assad had fled to Moscow and from Russia, a long-time ally.
A reversal of Iran's influence
The fall of Assad follows 13 years of brutal conflict that began in 2011 after pro-democracy protests were violently repressed by the Syrian regime. These protests quickly escalated into a civil war and later evolved into a multi-sided conflict involving numerous state-sponsored and non-state actors.
By 2020, Assad had regained control of most of Syria with support from Russia, Iran, and its allies, like Hezbollah, although some areas, like Idlib, remained outside of the regime’s control.
The war remained largely frozen for over four years before being reignited by the HTS-led offensive that ended the Assad dynasty's 53-year rule.
Assad’s overthrow will reshape not just Syria but the entire Middle East, dealing a major blow to Iran’s power in the region, which Tehran had built up via an ‘Axis of Resistance’ that included Assad’s Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and other Palestinian groups to counter US and Israeli influence in the region.
"The fall of Al-Assad's Syria will push the Axis of Resistance front into a severe crisis. It doesn't mean that the resistance front per se will disappear, but it will force Iran into a very intense recalculation of its options in the region and how to pursue them," Steven Heydemann, a professor of Middle East Studies at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, told °®Âþµº.
The rebel operation effectively removes Syria from the chain of actors Iran has built up, severing a crucial ally and strategic link between Tehran and Hezbollah. Heydemann says this will undermine Iran’s ability to maintain its influence in the eastern Mediterranean region in relation to other regional actors.
Iran and Hezbollah were instrumental in supporting the Assad regime during the Syrian war, helping to reclaim key territories in brutal fighting. Hezbollah also fought to maintain control of key supply routes in and out of Syria and prevent armed groups from entering Lebanon.
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Syria under Assad's rule was vital as it provided a direct channel for Iran's influence and military support in the region, serving as a land corridor for supplying Hezbollah and other allied groups, as well as a base for Iranian-supported militias playing a key role in pressuring Israel.
Nicholas Blandford, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, told TNA that Assad's Syria was seen as "a strategic linchpin" between Iran and Hezbollah, and his fall would now put Tehran in a difficult position, as this was "exactly what they [Iran and Hezbollah] sought to avoid by intervening in Syria".
This network has been severely strained over the past year after Hamas’ attack on 7 October led to Israel’s devastating war on Gaza – labelled a genocide by rights groups and international bodies – and Tel Aviv’s war on Lebanon with Hezbollah, including direct military confrontations between Israel and Iran for the first time.
These wars have put pressure on both Hamas and Hezbollah, with a ceasefire in Lebanon ending the Hezbollah-Israel conflict on 27 November, the same day the Syrian rebel offensive was launched.
Israel's wars have diverted Iran's attention and resources, with Israel also intensifying strikes on Iranian assets in Syria over the last year, weakening their influence. This, in part, explains Iran’s lack of support for Assad as rebels swept the country. The Syrian army also showed a reluctance to fight, undermining Iran’s potential efforts to launch a large-scale military counteroffensive that needed manpower and resources.
The possibility of a direct confrontation with Israel, a return to maximum pressure under the incoming Trump administration, and potential tensions with Turkey – believed to have consented to the rebel offensive if not officially backing it – all may have pressured Iran to avoid decisive action in supporting Assad.
Russia, a key ally of Assad but now focused on its war in Ukraine, carried out airstrikes against rebels in the early stage of the offensive, but did not provide further support.
Hezbollah, weakened by Israel’s war, also wasn't able to provide any significant support to the Syrian regime.
Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria
It is difficult to quantify Hezbollah's exact material and military losses during its nearly 14-month war with Israel.
The Lebanese group primarily used legacy weapons like unguided rockets, while more accurate and powerful weapons were rarely deployed.
However, despite Israel's air and technological superiority, demonstrated through airstrikes and the severe security breach involving pagers and walkie-talkies in Lebanon on 17 and 18 September, Hezbollah contained Israel's ground invasion, denying some Israeli objectives, such as the taking of the town of Khiam and the area of Bayada.
Nevertheless, Israel weakened Hezbollah's leadership through the assassination of top officials, including the killing of the group's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, on 27 September.
Nicholas Blandford from the Atlantic Council explained that although Hezbollah has been weakened militarily and politically, it still retains power in the domestic context. "We shouldn't overstate that weakness. They're still strong," he said.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah's main focus now appears to be supporting its constituency in Lebanon.
Newly elected Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem last week that the group has allocated around $77 million to families affected by the war with Israel and will provide lump sums and rent assistance for those whose homes were destroyed.
In addition to addressing social needs, Blandford explained that Hezbollah will navigate pressures to demilitarise south of the Litani River under the ceasefire agreement while regrouping.
Politically, it may compromise on issues like Lebanon's presidential election and agree to a demilitarised zone south of the Litani River. However, Hezbollah - Blandford continues - will maintain military activities north of the Litani, including training camps in the Bekaa Valley, which could provoke attacks from Israel. In this context, the Lebanese army will face pressure to enforce the ceasefire.
"The mutual deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel, which held since 2006, has collapsed. This shift leaves Hezbollah and Iran in a tough spot, as Israel's newfound confidence could embolden broader actions, even against Iran's nuclear infrastructure," he said.
In practical terms for Hezbollah, the fall of Assad means a disruption in the flow of weapons smuggling from Syria, which Israel has tried to interrupt with airstrikes along the Syrian border. This may force the Lebanese group to reconsider its supply routes.
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Iraq and Yemen
Before the Assad regime fell, some Iraqi Shia parties and armed groups, including the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), considered intervening in Syria.
Iran-backed militias had previously attacked US bases in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan in October, in support of Palestinians during Israel's Gaza war. However, after US airstrikes in February, these militia attacks largely ceased.
Yemen's Houthis continue to target commercial vessels in the Red Sea in support of Palestinians amid Israel's brutal ongoing destruction of Gaza while facing airstrikes from both Israel and the US.
Due to their more autonomous nature and differing priorities, the Houthis remain largely unaffected by the situation in Syria. As Iran's regional influence weakens, professor of Middle East Studies Steven Heydemann explains that the Houthis might either become more strategically important, or Iran could shift toward a diplomatic approach, improving ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which would reduce the Houthis' role in Iran's strategy.
With Iran’s deterrence capability weakened, he says that Iran may start rethinking its regional strategy, and “finally conclude that its best option is possibly pursuing nuclear weapons as a deterrent".
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights
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