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On 5 December, President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Mohammed bin Zayed met with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)’s acting Defence Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob in Abu Dhabi.

Few details were provided about the substance of their discussion, but Yaqoob’s meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed symbolised a potentially historic reset in IEA-UAE relations.

Although the UAE was one of only three countries, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which recognised the IEA’s legitimacy during its first stint in power from 1996-2001, Mohammed bin Zayed is widely believed to maintain a close relationship with the ousted President Ashraf Ghani.

Mohammed bin Zayed also covertly assassinating Taliban leaders during his January 2019 meeting with then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

The Taliban’s courtship of the UAE is driven by transactional benefits and its desire to moderate its image to the international community. It also serves as a hedge against the continued deterioration of IEA-Iran relations, which have spilt over to border disputes between the two countries.

The Taliban's reset with the UAE

Despite granting Ghani asylum on humanitarian grounds, the UAE has consistently engaged with the IEA since the Taliban seized control of Kabul in August 2021. The UAE’s on the Taliban takeover referred to Afghans as a “brotherly people” and on 3 September 2021, the UAE dispatched “urgent” medical and food aid to Afghanistan.

The UAE’s provisions of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan were its primary bridge with the Taliban authorities during the first half of 2022. The June 21 Khost earthquake was by large-scale Emirati humanitarian assistance, which included a 1,000 square-meter field hospital, 30 metric tons of food supplies and an air bridge for medical equipment.

The UAE also took steps to assuage the Taliban’s concerns about its sympathy with Afghanistan’s deposed authorities. Immediately after the Taliban takeover, Anwar Gargash, a senior diplomatic advisor to the UAE President, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid’s “emphasis on amnesty and tolerance over revenge” and pledge to respect women’s rights.

Gargash urged the international community to establish good relations with Afghanistan to ensure a prosperous future. Taliban Deputy spokesperson Ahmadullah Wasiq that the UAE barred Ghani, former Afghan national security advisor Hamdullah Mohib, and Balikh Province Governor Atta Muhammad Noor from engaging in political activities from exile.

The UAE’s humanitarian assistance provisions and conciliatory political gestures facilitated a deal to manage flights from Afghanistan’s three main airports: Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. Although Turkey and Qatar were initially expected to strike a deal with the Taliban to control these airports, the UAE made a concerted push to outbid its regional rivals.

In November 2021, the UAE with Taliban officials on administering Kabul Airport. The UAE’s diplomatic efforts initially bore little fruit. Turkey and Qatar reached a preliminary deal with the Taliban on airport security in January.

Although Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu proposed that Kabul airport could be operated under a Turkey-Qatar-UAE trilateral framework, the Taliban’s acting Culture and Information Minister Khairullah Khairkhwa stated on 12 March that the IEA would only turn to other countries if negotiations with Turkey and Qatar fell through.

Despite this lukewarm rhetoric, the Taliban expressed frustration with Turkey and Qatar’s insistence on dispatching their own security personnel to Afghan airports and reconsidered the UAE’s offer. On 24 May, the Taliban signed a deal with Abu Dhabi-based company GAAC Solutions to manage Afghanistan’s three main airports.

The Taliban’s Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar to Abu Dhabi to oversee the deal’s ratification and speak with Mohammed bin Zayed, who had just ascended to the UAE presidency. These talks paved the way for the contract’s finalisation on 8 September.

The Taliban authorities hope that this airport security deal will pave the way for UAE investments in Afghanistan’s heavily sanctioned economy. In December 2021, a UAE delegation met with the IEA’s acting Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund to discuss railway and solar power investments in Afghanistan.

As 300,000 Afghans live in the UAE and Afghan traders have $10 billion in investments in the UAE, Taliban officials hope to leverage their diasporic relations to secure new investments.

As the cumulative benefits of a decade of economic growth in Afghanistan were eviscerated during the first year of Taliban rule, receiving capital from the UAE was likely high on the Taliban delegation’s agenda during their recent visit to Abu Dhabi.

Despite steady progress in UAE-Taliban relations, the IEA’s continued restrictions on women’s rights and return to a hardline interpretation of Sharia law have raised alarm in Abu Dhabi.

On 20 October, UAE Ambassador to the UN Lana Nusseibeh described restrictions on female education in Afghanistan as a form of “gender apartheid.” Due to his relatively moderate views, Anas Haqqani’s meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed underscored the IEA’s desire to present a more progressive image of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Escalating tensions between the Taliban and Iran

Since the Taliban returned to power, Iran has implemented a policy of engagement without recognition towards the Taliban. This on Iran’s regular hosting of talks with Taliban officials in the decade prior to the US withdrawal and reflected Tehran’s hopes of cooperating with the IEA against the threat of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K).

Despite these deconfliction efforts, border clashes between Afghanistan and Iran have flared on an intermittent basis. In March 2022, at least four Iranian fighters were killed in clashes with Taliban forces in Nimroz. These clashes were triggered by Iran’s efforts to thwart Afghan farmers from digging a canal in the Sekhsar area and ensure that the Taliban did not block water flows from the Hirmand River to Iran.

The Taliban’s incursion into Hirmand, Iran in late July, which saw Taliban forces plant the IEA flag on the Iranian territory, resulted in one fatality. In response to these clashes, Iran has periodically closed its borders with Afghanistan and taken steps towards constructing a border wall.

While Iranian and Afghan officials have tried to keep these frictions under the radar, leaked comments from Iran’s Ambassador to Afghanistan Bahadoor Amininan revealed the scope of tensions.

Aminian that the Taliban said “We must not give even a drop of water to Iran” and expressed concern that the IEA could eventually strike a deal with the US. Aminian also described the Taliban’s takeover as a disaster for Afghanistan, the region and the world, and insisted that Iran has no choice but try to “civilize them”.

Although the Iranian Embassy in Kabul denied Aminian’s comments and accused the hackers of Fars News Agency who leaked them of creating a regional crisis, they nonetheless reflected Tehran’s unvoiced frustrations with Taliban rule.

Despite the souring of Iran-IEA relations, a return to the state of open hostilities that almost led to war in 1998 is unlikely. Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi for an expansion of bilateral trade with Iran and a new Iran-Afghanistan transit route is currently being constructed in Nimruz.

The Taliban’s Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry Noorudin Azizi Iran as a “friend of Afghanistan” and called for an expansion of Iranian investments. Solidarity Afghan and Iranian women’s rights activists, which have been on public display since the Iran protests began in September, could also prevent Tehran from criticising the IEA’s social policies.

As the eighteen-month anniversary of the Taliban takeover approaches, the IEA is seeking to diversify its array of partnerships in the Middle East. Beyond preserving its long-standing alignments with Turkey and Qatar, the Taliban will seek to strengthen relations with the UAE and maintain its increasingly uneasy partnership with Iran.

Samuel Ramani is a tutor of politics and international relations at the University of Oxford, where he received a doctorate in 2021. His research focuses on Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East

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