°źÂț”ș

Following the assassination of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh by Israel in Iran on 31 July, international observers have cautiously awaited what could come next amid the looming threat of a regional escalation.

In particular, Russia is navigating a delicate balance between advancing its soft power diplomacy while hoping to avert any deeper escalation between Iran and Israel.

Yet, while already bogged down in the Ukraine war, Moscow has opportunistically sought to capitalise on the growing tensions. Since October 2023, when Israel began its assault on Gaza following Hamas’ attack, Russia has criticised both Israel and the United States.

This ranged from Vladimir Putin likening Israel’s siege of Gaza to Germany’s blockade of Leningrad during World War II, to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warning that Israel’s actions contravene international law.

And in condemning Washington’s firm support for Israel, Putin has said the Gaza war is a “vivid example” of US failures in the region.

Moscow had largely aimed to boost its popularity among the region’s pro-Palestinian populations and align itself with governments that back a ceasefire.

"Russia wants to be visibly part of the 'Global South' standing up to [Western] 'imperialism,' but that's mostly optics,” Joost Hiltermann, MENA Program Director at the International Crisis Group, told °źÂț”ș.

“It has no interest in an escalation in the region,” he added.

In terms of influence, Moscow has sought to advance its position as a regional powerbroker. Indeed, Russia has also met with Hamas leaders during the war, as well as hosting key officials from both Hamas and Fatah in January with the aim of mediating Palestinian unity.

Moreover, Russia has also seen the necessity of bolstering ties with Iran and Arab Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.Ìę

Putin’s vision of positioning Moscow as a ‘regional powerbroker’ has steadily grown since Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015 to shore up Bashar Al-Assad’s regime against Syrian opposition forces during the country’s brutal civil war.

However, since Iran's drone and missile strikes on Israel in April, in retaliation for Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, new challenges have emerged for Moscow’s regional goals, as tensions between Iran and Israel have escalated into uncharted territory.

Deepening ties with Iran

Russia has continued supplying Iran with defensive weaponryÌęas the risk of Tehran becoming entangled in a war with IsraelÌęgrows. Last week, Moscow reportedly sent Tehran an array of military equipment, including radars and air defence systems, according to Iranian officials.

Firstly, Moscow wants to protect its ties with Tehran, which has served as an important military partner for Russia in the Middle East. Exemplifying their close partnership, Tehran has supplied Moscow with drones for its war in Ukraine and is in talks to deliver ballistic missiles too.

However, it comes as Russia has also sought to advance other shared interests with Iran. On 6 August, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council Sergei Shoigu travelled to Tehran to meet with recently elected Iranian President Masoud PezeshkianÌęandÌędiscuss strengthening bilateral ties and broader cooperation.

While they discussed initiatives like the North-South Corridor - a 7,200-kilometre multi-mode transport network connecting several countries, including Russia and Iran - it allowed both officials to jointly denounce the US again.

"We believe that the era of one-upmanship of some powers, including the United States, in the world is over," Pezeshkian stated, advocating for the furthering of a multipolar world.

Russia's balancing act

Despite its efforts to prioritise ties with Iran, Moscow has remained cautious over Iran’s retaliation, given that a strong response could provoke a severe Israeli reaction.

According to Reuters, two senior Iranian sources indicated that Russia has called on Iran to engage in a limited response towards Israel, one that would minimise civilian casualties.

That shows Moscow would prefer an Iranian retaliation which ‘saves face,’ rather than one that risks a dangerous escalation.

Crucially, this echoes a trend of Russia’s efforts to discourage an escalation. But that has posed a challenging balancing act for Moscow, too.

“Russia's de-escalation efforts have earned periodic rebukes in Tehran, especially from hardliners who are frustrated with Russia's unwillingness to let Assad use Syrian air defences to shoot down Israeli aircraft,” Samuel Ramani, associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told °źÂț”ș.

“Russia is generally sceptical of Iran's ability to keep its Axis of Resistance intact in the event of a regional war, but it won't rush to Iran's aid either.”

Russia has deployed this balancing act strategy elsewhere regionally. Last week, it came to light that Russia had threatened to arm Yemen’s Houthis rebels amid the faction firing missiles on Red Sea trade and targeting Israel with drones and missiles.

In the end, Russia did not proceed with this threat, following pressure from Saudi Arabia and the US.

This primarily signals Moscow’s attempts to placate Riyadh, as well as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both of whom were at war with the Houthis from 2015, are regional partners of Russia, and are still cautious of the security threat which the Yemeni faction may pose.

Despite its desires to advance its own influence regionally, Moscow is evidently mindful of these red lines.

“Russia's approach toward Iran and the Houthis has been cautious,” Rauf Mammadov, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, told °źÂț”ș. “With the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia recognises that it cannot afford to become entangled in another conflict.”

Given Russia’s caution, and its desire to maintain its relations with Saudi Arabia, which is also an OPEC+ partner, Mammadov added that “Russia's military assistance to Iran is likely to remain defensive in nature, while its support for the Houthis will remain minimal, likely limited to consultations".Ìę

"Russia has already expended much of its military and political capital in Ukraine, limiting its own ability to influence developments in the Middle East"

Caution in the Middle East

As with Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Moscow has also vocally condemned US-UK airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthis for their attacks on Red Sea trade.

Moreover, Moscow has courted the Houthis and maintained contacts with them to gain assurances that it will not target Russian trade.

Yet even this has not been fully successful, as the Houthis have occasionally linked to Russia.

Despite Moscow’s verbal condemnations and apparent alignment with the Houthis, it may hope for an end to Red Sea tensions while it cannot influence much on the ground itself.

Beyond Iran and its relations with Moscow, Russia has maintained a tricky balancing act in its ties with Israel. For all of Moscow’s criticisms of Israel, it has still hoped to avoid a breakdown in relations with Tel Aviv.

“The severe deterioration of Russia-Israel relations doesn't help matters, and Israel has been infuriated by Russia's engagement with Hamas and its welcoming of key leadership figures to Moscow,” said Samuel Ramani.

Ramani added that Moscow is a marginal player in the region, and “cannot exert much concrete diplomatic influence or contribute to what it rhetorically supports: a settlement to the Gaza war that creates a Palestinian state”.

From Moscow’s perspective, it may have hoped that regional tensions would divert US attention, aid, and weapons to the Middle East and away from Ukraine.

Yet, while the US has been able to juggle its vast military assets between different theatres, including Taiwan, Russia has already expended much of its military and political capital in Ukraine, limiting its own ability to influence developments in the Middle East.

For now, Russia will focus on reinforcing its position as much as possible, likely aiming to strengthen Iran's defences in the event it becomes embroiled in a conflict with Israel.

And despite its physical limitations to project influence amid the unfolding tensions, Moscow's efforts have still aimed to boost its soft power regionally and beyond.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

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