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On 23 November, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey would embark on a ground operation against “terrorists” in northern Syria at the “most convenient time for us”.

This pledge, which followed Turkish airstrikes against Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) militias in Syria, underscored Erdogan’s commitment to a harsh response to the 13 November bombing in central Istanbul that killed 6 people.

While Turkey has yet to act on this threat, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) suspended joint operations with the US on 2 December and are priming themselves for a full-scale Turkish intervention.

Due to its alliance with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and military presence in northern Syria, Russia views Turkey’s potential offensive against the SDF with concern. To prevent a Turkish intervention, Russia has blended diplomacy and deterrence.

Despite Moscow’s desire to avoid an escalation, the risk of a major Russia-Turkey confrontation in Syria remains minimal, even if Erdogan opts for a sweeping ground operation. Instead, Russia might try to capitalise on an offensive by encouraging greater cooperation between the SDF and Assad.

"While Russia is unlikely to retaliate against any large-scale Turkish offensive in northern Syria, it will likely step up its diplomatic role to leverage the crisis to its advantage"

Russia's response to Turkey's impending offensive

In keeping with its rhetorical support for Syria’s sovereignty, Russia has condemned Turkey’s prospective ground operations in Syria. During the 22 November Astana meeting between Russia, Iran, and Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiyev urged Turkey to show “restraint” and warned that an escalation of tensions in northern Syria could spread across the country.

Lavrentiyev claimed that Russia had been trying to prevent a large-scale Turkish ground operation in Syria for months and noted that Turkey did not consult with Moscow before carrying out airstrikes against the YPG. Turkey’s unilateral decision rankled the Kremlin, as its jets through Russian-controlled airspace before carrying out the strikes.

On 30 November, Russia deployed troop reinforcements to Tal Rifaat, a Kurdish-held pocket north of Aleppo that is located 15km from the Turkey-Syria border. Russia’s reinforcements created an informal demarcation line between Russian-aligned forces, which control areas to the south of Tal Rifaat, and Turkish-backed troops, which control areas to the north of Tal Rifaat.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) believes that Russia’s deployment of reinforcements is paired with an expanded troop presence in an Assad-controlled airbase near Tal Rifaat and by similar troop deployments on the outskirts of Kobani.

Russia’s response to the latest episode of brinkmanship on the Turkey-Syria border mirrors its handling of the early summer escalation of tensions. After Turkey’s Security Council endorsed a military operation in northern Syria on 26 May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Ankara to urge Turkey to refrain from a large-scale escalation.

Russia also reinforced its military positions near Tal Rifaat, Manbij, the southern outskirts of Kobani and Ain Issa, which are located 40km from the Turkish border. Major Youssef Hammoud, a spokesperson for the Turkish-aligned Syrian National Army (SNA), claimed that Russian helicopters landed at an air base close to Tal Rifaat.

These striking parallels suggest that Russia’s retaliatory moves are likely anticipated and accounted for by Turkish officials, as they prepare for a broader military campaign.

Why a Russia-Turkey escalation remains unlikely

Despite the close proximity of Russian and Turkish forces in northern Syria, a major military escalation between the two powers remains unlikely. Both sides will seek to avoid a repeat of the 27 February 2020 Balyun airstrikes, which saw Russia kill up to 34 Turkish troops and resulted in Turkey’s one-week Operation Spring Shield offensive in Idlib.

This does not preclude asymmetric Russian airstrikes in Idlib, such as those that occurred in early October. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has to the prospect of intensified Russian bombings to encourage a last-ditch rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

However, an overarching desire for deconfliction endures. Even if Turkey’s offensive in northern Syria is more expansive and longer lasting than previous campaigns, Russia is unlikely to deepen its military involvement for three reasons.

First, Russia’s overall military presence in Syria has noticeably ebbed since its invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February. On 19 October, The New York Times that Russia withdrew an S-300 air defence system from Syria and paired this removal with the exit of a portion of its ground troop contingent.

"Russia's overall military presence in Syria has noticeably ebbed since its invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February"

Israeli satellite intelligence this report, as it shows that Russia’s S-300 system in Masyaf was transferred to Novorossiyk, Ukraine via Tartous in August 2022. The enduring momentum of Ukraine’s counter-offensive suggests that Russia is unlikely to undo this redeployment or intensify airstrikes in Syria, which are already at their lowest levels since Assad requested Russian assistance in September 2015.

Second, Russian hardline commentators, who have shaped Putin’s approach to the Ukraine war in recent months, view the SDF in a very negative light. A 22 November post on the influential Rybar Telegram channel the SDF of abetting the spread of terrorism in Syria, which it blamed on Turkey, Russia and the US, and of using the pretext of fighting the Islamic State (IS) to extract financial aid from the US.

On 27 November, former Kremlin advisor Sergei Markov that Russia tacitly approves of Turkey’s intervention in Syria provided that it weakens “pro-American Kurds” and does not threaten Assad’s grip on power. This suggests that the Kremlin is unlikely to take action that aids the SDF, even if it views Turkey’s actions as destabilising.

Third, Russia views Turkey as an increasingly important partner due to its resistance to Western sanctions and mediation role in the Ukraine War and does not wish to derail Moscow-Ankara cooperation in Idlib.

On 6 June, Lavrov the legitimacy of Turkey’s security concerns in Syria, which he attributed to “separatist sentiments” fuelled by “illegally present” US forces. Lavrov has repeatedly vowed to uphold agreements between Russia and Turkey on a Syria settlement and insisted that they are making slow but steady progress.

The continuation of Russia-Turkey joint patrols in Kobani, even after Ankara angered Moscow by blocking the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to warships on 28 February, underscores the resilience of Russia-Turkey cooperation in Syria.

A potential Russian diplomatic role in northern Syria

While Russia is unlikely to retaliate against any large-scale Turkish offensive in northern Syria, it will likely step up its diplomatic role to leverage the crisis to its advantage. During Turkey’s October 2019 Operation Peace Spring offensive, Russia participated in talks between the SDF and Assad on containing Ankara’s presence.

Russia has subsequently used the spectre of a potentially abrupt US withdrawal from Syria to encourage talks between the SDF and Assad that bypass Washington.

During the current escalation, the SDF has reportedly asked Russia to broker an agreement with Damascus. Russia will likely use its North Thunderbolt joint operations room, which is located in Haradtnin in the northern countryside of Aleppo, to facilitate cooperation between the SDF, Assad, and Iran-aligned battalions, such as Fatemiyoun.

"The success or failure of Russia's diplomatic efforts in Syria will be a major test of its ability to remain a great power in the post-Ukraine invasion geopolitical environment"

Despite these efforts, mistrust between Russia and the SDF could restrict the scope of a potential agreement. On 22 November, SDF commander Mazium Kobane with Russia’s silence towards Turkey’s escalatory moves and believes that Moscow is not sufficiently pressuring Assad to engage with the SDF.

Turkey’s recent claims that Russia is trying to convince Assad and Kurdish forces to withdraw from Tal Rifaat will add further to the brewing mistrust between Moscow and the SDF.

Although Russian forces remain mired in Ukraine, the Kremlin views its foothold in Syria as vital for its influence in the Middle East and will watch Turkey’s next moves with trepidation. The success or failure of Russia’s diplomatic efforts in Syria will be a major test of its ability to remain a great power in the post-Ukraine invasion geopolitical environment.

Samuel Ramani is a tutor of politics and international relations at the University of Oxford, where he received a doctorate in 2021.ĚýHis research focuses on Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East

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