Lebanon's opposition today: A story of perpetual crises
7 min read
On 15 May last year, Lebanon held its first general parliamentary elections after the 17 October uprising of 2019. Accordingly, the countryās anti-establishment movement won 13 seats in an unprecedented advancement for non-sectarian forces.
Hezbollah and its allies had lost their majority, the MPs which formerly constituted the traditional āMarch 14ā bloc are no longer a coherent entity, and the population had new faces to anticipate.
However, since then, most opposition MPs have not been able to forward a coherent program or discourse. Specifically, the 13 MPs within the so-called āChange Blocā couldnāt agree on one particular name to back for the presidency following the end of Michel Aounās term.
Some went further to espouse support for typical establishment figureheads, such as Michel Mouawad, who has had close links with powerful financial institutions blocking an economic rescue plan.
"Lebanon's 17 October revolution was a product of diverse and conflicting conditions, including the efforts of a few thousand activists who constituted the country's 'secular community' over the years"
The elected oppositionās lack of political cohesion is simply one illustration of the crisis faced by the countryās progressive non-sectarian movement more generally. Besides that, emigration became a reality for a large portion of ³¢±š²ś²¹²Ō“Ē²Ōās political activists and organisers. Overall, a sense of fatigue, disappointment, and disenchantment became the norm for most participants.
But explaining the elements of this crisis and the methods through which it can be resolved requires going deeper than the current moment.
In 2011, significant demonstrations inspired by the Arab Spring strengthened the case for a secular country and sparked the gradual build-up and institutionalisation of a variety of alternative parties and groups. Success and failure start here, and the agency of those involved ought to be considered.
Accumulative growth since 2011
³¢±š²ś²¹²Ō“Ē²Ōās 17 October revolution was a product of diverse and conflicting conditions, including the efforts of a few thousand activists who constituted the countryās āsecular communityā over the years.
Following the polarising events of 7 May 2008, during which pro- and anti-Hezbollah militiamen fought between Beirut and Mount Lebanon, a revived oppositional consciousness started to take shape against the sectarian system and parties which took part in its contradictions and contestations.
From the calling for the fall of the āsectarian regimeā in 2011 to the marches rejecting a parliamentary term extension in 2013 and the larger demonstrations in response to the garbage crisis in 2015, ³¢±š²ś²¹²Ō“Ē²Ōās anti-establishment movement seemingly grew as a reaction to numerous regime crises.
Afterwards, a more organised opposition front took to the ballot boxes in the 2016 Beirut municipality elections, the 2017 engineering syndicate elections, and the 2018 parliamentary elections. Despite mainly ālosingā in absolute numbers, progress was being made.
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On the student level, the Secular Clubs in several universities have been competing against sectarian parties since 2008, achieving significant electoral wins in key private institutions, despite immense in the public Lebanese University.
In parallel, several left-leaning and grassroots feminist organisations and spaces also and developed between 2015 and 2022, centring the interests of marginalised groups and a progressive economic agenda as their primary focus. On the other hand, the question of how to tackle and analyse the role of Hezbollahās arms remained a source of dispute.
The ā17 Octoberā uprising, which witnessed the organisational capacity and micro-leadership of several faces within this diverse āsecular communityā, changed the equation, and the discourse put forth since 2008 had gradually become mainstream.
"Amid major crises since 2019, secular and alternative forces have made significant yet fluctuating gains in student elections, syndicate elections, and parliamentary elections"
Limited accomplishment in the face of enormous challenges
Despite clear challenges, the non-sectarian movement played a crucial role in creating a āthird wayā. Also, in the presence of a 13-member parliamentary bloc, they contributed to blocking Hezbollah and its alliesā capacity to hold a parliamentary majority.
In the past three years, Lebanon has faced enormous challenges under the Covid-19 pandemic, a collapsing currency, hyperinflation, the Beirut port explosion, increased use of repression and political violence, and emigration. The last factor heavily affected large parts of the countryās youth and professional labour force in their ability to mobilise on the ground.
Amid these difficulties, secular and alternative forces made significant yet fluctuating gains in student elections, syndicate elections, and parliamentary elections.
Their elected representatives within these various institutions also demonstrated more seriousness in terms of tackling matters which matter to the population, such as fighting for affordable health and education, challenging bankĢżownersā moves to block an economic rescue plan and sound fiscal policy, and starting a conversation about the future of the countryās sectarian political system.
On a practical level, they played an important role in establishing rescue teams amid the stateās inability to āmanageā the aftermath of the port explosion in 2020. Similar funding initiatives of various kinds contributed to the creation of a parallel service economy.
Most importantly, the active participation in many of these groups, projects, and electoral milestones created a new community of activists who have gained action-based political experience, learning the basic tools of how to deal with power, influence, strategy, and basic organisation.
Many 'startups' but few sustainable political projects
A lot was achieved, nevertheless, many initiatives were launched and operated by specific individuals and their direct circle of activists. Very few sustainable institutional frameworks were formed in the process. Instead, opposition organisations took the form of āstartupsā with a much less ambitious trajectory in terms of ideological cohesion and financial/material capacity.
In this sense, thereās a clear contrast between Lebanon and other cases in the region. While ātraditionalā non-sectarian parties in Lebanon such as the Lebanese Communist Party and the National Bloc play a role to this day, they noticeably lack the popular mass found in movements like the Iraqi Communist Party.
In Sudan, established professional played a leading role in organising dissent, while newly established alternative syndicates in Lebanon faced enormous continuity challenges.
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Besides that, instead of actively recruiting, activating, and conversing with new social groups, these āstartupsā also regularly competed for a larger share amongst the same crowd of non-sectarian activists.
Consequently, list formation during the past elections indicated competing alignments which constituted different āactivist startupsā, each of which had its āstar candidateā and borderline individualistic priorities. These priorities hindered their incentive to propose concrete policies and form alliances which challenge the regimeās neoliberal setup.
While relatively new progressive political parties and grassroots movements with some legacy showed progress, internal disputes, limited reach, and bad strategy continue to be obstacles
Citizens in a State, an opposition party led by economist Charbel Nahhas and established in 2016, implemented an ambitious plan to run in almost all districts in the election under the banner of a ācomprehensive political-economic projectā. However, the party leadershipās inability to achieve favourable outcomes and mediate internal structural matters led to many recent .
On the other hand, more flexible and horizontal left-leaning movements such as the āā, which constitutes more than 15 youth-led secular clubs across various spaces, raise legitimate questions about the shortcomings of āleaderlessnessā in youth movements given the magnitude of both the obstacles and ambitious political objectives put forth.
"While relatively new progressive political parties and grassroots movements with some legacy showed progress, internal disputes, limited reach, and bad strategy continue to be obstacles"
The quest for leadership and political maturity
Itās crucial to position the successes and faults of ³¢±š²ś²¹²Ō“Ē²Ōās opposition as a product of the decisions, strategies, and labour of its primary leaders and participants.
Accordingly, the solution to todayās crisis amongst progressive and democratic new movements in Lebanon has many parallels with their counterparts in other Arab countries following the 2011 uprisings.
Most importantly, intellectuals cannot stand on the margins as discursive critics; their involvement is crucial for the strategic development of the movementās political and economic projects and theory of change.
In other words, transformative processes require power, leadership, and action. āLeaderlessnessā was tactically celebrated during the initial phase of the uprising, but organisers soon noticed it produced a detrimental situation in which loud voices held power and āstructurelessnessā killed sound decision-making and strategy.
Finally, political āstartupsā cannot compete forever. Historical moments require the unification of forces which hold similar objectives in the pursuit of creating solid, ambitious political parties.
Karim Safieddine is a political writer based in Lebanon.
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