°®Âþµº

The resumption this week of overtime talks between the US, world powers and Iran in Geneva is an indication of just how far Washington has proven willing to go to secure a deal over Iran's disputed nuclear programme.

With Barack Obama into the last two years of his presidency, a nuclear deal with Iran seems to have become a legacy question for the US president and is directly impacting US policy on Syria, Iran's close ally.

It is not clear, however, how far Iran, which increasingly seems to see itself as in the stronger negotiating position, is itself willing to go to meet world demands to scale back the ambitions of its programme.

The talks in Geneva, which started Monday with bilateral talks between Iran and the US and ended Wednesday with a summit of the whole P5+1 grouping of world powers – the US, UK, Germany, France, China and Russia – were the first negotiations since an extension was agreed in November when a deadline for agreement passed.

"Intense" talks

The talks were "intense" and "useful", according to Iranian chief negotiator and deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, who said the teams were due to meet again in January.

But so far, "useful" has not led far. The current negotiations – and their extension – is the result of an interim deal agreed back in November 2013 under which the Islamic Republic agreed to freeze parts of its programme in return for temporary and partial relief from international sanctions.

This interim deal has so far proven the maximum extent of cooperation. Even though senior American and Iranian officials have started face-to-face talks for the first time since 1979, they have so far been talking past each other.

A clue as to why came a few years back. When delegations from the P5+1 and Iran met in Baghdad in May 2012, Tehran's then top negotiator Saeed Jalili suddenly went off script: "What about Syria," he demanded to know.

This was a year after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution which Iran's ally, Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president, had turned into a bloody ordeal. The American and European delegations were caught off guard. They responded that they were not authorised to discuss issues other than Iran’s nuclear programme.

Since then, Iran's negotiating team under former President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has been replaced by an arguably friendlier group under his successor Hassan Rouhani. Assad has succeeded – with heavy Iranian assistance – in rolling back many rebel advances. And US foreign policy under Obama has drifted to such an extent that a breakthrough deal with Iran is increasingly being seen as his only face-saving exit.

What about Syria?

Even though the United States evaded Jalili's question on Syria in 2012, it took notice. Through Oman, former Under Secretary of State Bill Burns and National Security Council's Jake Sullivan opened a secret backchannel with Iran. By November 2013, secret diplomacy had borne fruit in the guise of the Geneva interim deal.

But that's as far as it has gone. In his public appearances since, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has talked about a "paradigm shift" that mandates a revised western view of Tehran. The West, according to Zarif, has declined, while "the rest" – first and foremost Iran – have risen. The West should therefore recognise Iran's "right to enrich uranium" and acknowledge its interests throughout the Middle East.

The West, according to Zarif, has declined, while "the rest" – first and foremost Iran – have risen. The West should therefore recognise Iran's "right to enrich uranium".

In return for such a revised position, Iran is willing to "promise" that it will not produce a nuclear bomb. Iran is also willing to step up and "stabilise" the region, a step that it depicted as a service to Washington and western capitals.

A promise is not the basis for agreement, but Obama seems to believe that once the process of American rapprochement with Iran begins, it will take a life of its own and create a new dynamic. If Iran can open its oil-rich economy to American companies and at the same time do Washington's dirty and costly work of finishing off groups like the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS), then that will be "two birds with one stone".

US compromises

To make sure that nothing upsets Tehran in the meantime, Obama has forbidden direct or indirect military action against Assad. In Iraq, Obama has reneged on his promise to form – out of tribal fighters – a Sunni National Guard independent of Baghdad's Shia-dominated central government. In Lebanon, the least strategically important of the three, Washington had already succumbed to Iranian dominance through Hizballah.

Yet despite Obama's concessions, Iran has refused to reciprocate. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei turned down offers for a "research oriented" nuclear programme, called such a scheme mere décor, and insisted on Iran’s "right" to enrich uranium on an industrial scale. The only safeguard the world has so far been assured of that Iran will not use its programme to make bombs is simply Iran's word, or Khamenei’s fatwa.

With Iran dominant in Iraq and Lebanon, making inroads in Yemen through the Houthi movement, and with the Syrian regime holding up, Iran sees itself in a strong bargaining position. Tehran is seeking complete American concessions in these countries, essentially for the US and its regional allies to disown their embattled allies there.

New relationship

Will it wash in Washington? Obama has shown an inclination to go against received wisdom in Beltway circles to pursue a deal with Iran. But Iran's position is proving harder to swallow for his European, Arab and Turkish allies. With Washington stepping back, Paris has played the role of spoiler in the interest of America's traditional allies.

Still, in his remaining years in office, Obama may feel a deal with Iran can save a foreign policy legacy that otherwise has precious little to show for it. He is certainly pushing hard. He has communicated directly with Khamenei hinting at Iranian gains if Tehran concedes on its nuclear programme. Khamenei did not budge. Even Iran's distressed economy has not convinced the supreme leader of the urgency of reaching a deal and lifting sanctions. Instead, Khamenei has stuck to the defunct economic principle of self-sufficiency.

Despite this rebuff, Obama still seems convinced by what he told Bloomberg News in March. "If you look at the Iranian behaviour," he said then, "they are strategic, they’re not impulsive." He added: "They have a worldview, and they see their interests, and they respond to costs and benefits."

That rare glimpse into Obama's thinking on Iran suggests he is betting Tehran will agree to turn its nuclear programme into a face-saving research programme in return for Iran's reintegration into the world economy and the restoration of its regional and political partnership with America, similar to pre-1979 relations.

If not, and at the very least, Obama will run down the clock on Iran, Syria, Iraq and IS. The longer the talks with Iran, the closer his exit from the White House. In January 2017, these crises will become someone else's problems. Obama will have managed to stick to his foreign policy slogan of "don’t do stupid stuff"; in this case perhaps better understood as, "don’t do anything at all".

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.