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President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey announced on 12 December that Ankara had successfully brokered talks between Somalia and Ethiopia to resolve growing tensions between the two countries on the back of the latter’s deal with the separatist Somaliland.

Relations between the two Horn of Africa nations have soured over the past year following a January memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The agreement granted Addis Ababa 19 kilometres of Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden for access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognising Somaliland’s independence.��

Mogadishu perceived this deal as a direct challenge to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the aftermath of the deal, Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia in protest and began leaning more towards Egypt, which has been strategically strengthening alliances with Somalia and Eritrea, two of Ethiopia's key neighbours, in a bid to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and to pressure Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).��

Egypt has deepened its engagement in the Horn of Africa through a series of strategic investments, including a landmark defence pact with Somalia in August to enhance security cooperation. Under the agreement, Egypt the Somali National Army with military aid, beginning with a shipment on 27 August, followed by additional deliveries in late September and November.

Cairo’s involvement extended beyond arms transfers, as it positioned itself as a potential peacekeeping force in Somalia. This during an October summit in Asmara, where the leaders of Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea pledged to strengthen regional security ties. Turkey’s mediation, however, could potentially throw a wrench in these carefully calculated efforts.

Turkey's moves

According to a statement by Turkish authorities, Ankara’s efforts to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, which began in August with a preliminary agreement, will be negotiated further in February 2024, and if needed, Turkey will continue to act as a mediator.

Both parties agreed to set aside disputed issues, explore bilateral agreements, and allow Ethiopia secure access to the Red Sea under Somali sovereignty and oversight. Addis Ababa has also committed to respecting Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and independence.

“Ethiopia retreated from recognising Somaliland as an independent entity,” Amani El-Tawil, Director of the African Program at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, told ������.��

She attributes this to two factors. “First, practical difficulties in implementing the agreement, as most tribes in Somaliland’s Awdal region, where the proposed port and military base are located, opposed the deal and threatened to block it by force.”��

The second reason was the inauguration of Somaliland’s new president Abdirahman Irro, who “appears to be less enthusiastic about the memorandum signed by his predecessor, Musa Bihi Abdi”.

The Egyptian-Eritrean-Somali alliance had “posed a military threat to Ethiopia,” and Egypt informed Washington of its openness to “all options in the coming phase if Egypt’s concerns regarding GERD during drought periods are not addressed,” El-Tawil noted.

“On the global level, former US President Donald Trump’s return to the political scene has also pressured Ethiopia,” she added. “During his previous term, Trump maintained a negative stance towards Ethiopia’s regional policies.”

Domestically, Ethiopia faces mounting challenges, according to El-Tawil. These include the escalating internal conflict in the Amhara region in addition to Ethiopia’s disputes with Eritrea and Sudan as well as Djibouti’s growing sense of alienation from Addis Ababa, all of which “further weaken” Ethiopia’s position.

“Turkey demonstrated diplomatic agility,” she said, adding that “Ethiopia had to make several concessions, which will be further explored in February”.

Will the peace last?

Egyptian diplomat Mona Omar, a former Assistant Foreign Minister for African Affairs, voiced scepticism about the durability of the Ankara agreement, pointing to Ethiopia’s history of reneging on its commitments.

“Ethiopia signed an understanding with Eritrea in Algiers in 2000, only for relations to deteriorate as a result of Ethiopia’s unilateral actions,” she said.

She added that Egypt supports any initiative that fosters “regional stability while safeguarding its national security and sovereignty”. However, Omar noted that “Egypt’s objection to Ethiopia stemmed from Addis Ababa’s unilateral dealings with Somaliland, which undermined Somalia’s sovereignty”.

Ethiopian political scientist Abdushakur Hassan, on the other hand, remains optimistic about the agreement.��

“The agreement has a significant chance of success because all factors point in its favour,” he told ������. “The shared history between Ethiopia and Somalia could pave the way for closer ties in the long term.”

Hassan described Ethiopia’s role in Somalia as “essential” for maintaining “state stability and restoring security,” adding that the newly-inked agreement could serve as a foundation for strategic relations and dispel “mutual fears and mistrust,” which he attributed to both internal and external actors.

Omar, on the other hand, ruled out the possibility of the Ankara agreement affecting Egypt’s military and diplomatic ties with Somalia.��

“Egypt and Somalia have a joint defence agreement, whereas the Ankara agreement is a peace accord. The two serve entirely different purposes,” she explained. “Cairo’s agreement with Somalia obliges intervention only in cases of threats to Somalia’s sovereignty or security.”

Somalia's choice

Iman Abdel Azim, a political science professor at Cairo University, agreed, stating that given the current context of Egyptian-Somali relations, “Somalia will not jeopardise its ties with Cairo”. She warned, however, that Somalia should not be forced to choose between Egypt and Turkey.

According to Abdel Azim, historically, “Somalia has been under Turkish patronage,” and nothing significant happens there without Turkish involvement. “If weighed against each other, Turkey’s influence would likely outweigh Egypt's,” she said.��

She also criticised Turkey’s interventions, adding that “Turkish moves” consistently “undermine Arab and Egyptian influence wherever they occur”.

Yet, Omar disagrees with the notion that Egypt was caught off guard.��

“This Turkish mediation has been in the works for some time, and we were informed by the Turks. It did not catch us by surprise," she revealed.

Meanwhile, Hassan does not view Egypt’s recent moves in the Horn of Africa as part of a strategic vision but rather as "a reaction to a series of Ethiopian actions" in the region.��

"It is not in Egypt’s interest to conflict with any country in the region, especially one as significant as Ethiopia, given its capabilities and strategic location," he said, highlighting what he sees as a missed opportunity.

"We had hoped Egypt would take Ethiopia’s place in fostering dialogue, promoting reconciliation, and considering strategic relations across the region as a whole, but that did not happen," he added.

Asked whether Egypt and Ethiopia could replicate the Ankara model, Omar was sceptical.

“There is already a dam built. What we want is joint management to protect Egypt’s water security during crises like droughts,” she said. “Ethiopia needs political change. One that recognises the rights of its neighbours and avoids antagonistic policies.”

This piece was published in collaboration with��.