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The Sahel region is overcast with the possibility of a military intervention in Niger.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional bloc made up of 15 countries, is threatening the leaders of last month’s military coup with military interference to reinstate ousted President Mohamed Bazoum.��

This prospect brings back memories of its previous interventions, raising questions about the organisation's ability to engage in this kind of operation once again and the expected repercussions.

"Despite being an organisation for economic cooperation, ECOWAS has always had a security and military component within its agenda"

A history of interventions

On Friday, ECOWAS set a date for potential military intervention in Niger. According to Ismail Hammoudi, professor of political science at the University of Fez in Morocco, this development reflects, “the depth of shock and fear of the new coup wave in West Africa.”

Hammoudi explained to ������ that this is the first time in recent years that ECOWAS has approved military intervention against a coup regime in West Africa, knowing that the region has recently witnessed coups in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso.

Despite being an organisation for economic cooperation, ECOWAS has always had a security and military component within its agenda, as achieving political and security stability is a major condition for advancing the economic wheel.

In this context, the organisation approved the in 1981, which identified a group of cases that allow military intervention.

Later, the charter was expanded with a mechanism for preventing, managing and settling conflicts in the countries of the community, allowing intervention to confront the overthrow of an elected government.

1990 witnessed the of “ECOWAS,” as a force was sent to Liberia to intervene in the civil war between the forces of President Samuel Doe and two rebel factions.

Since then, ECOWAS has militarily intervened in several West African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.

Mahfoudh Saleck, a Morocco-based journalist, categorises the military interventions of ECOWAS in three patterns.

“The first is intervention to defuse civil wars and acts of tension, as happened in Liberia in 1990. The second is to confront the military coups like in Sierra Leone in 1998, and the third is to defend democracy, as happened in Gambia in 2017, before the last-minute mediation succeeded,” Saleck explained to TNA.

Is a Niger intervention possible?

On 6 August, the one-week deadline granted by ECOWAS to the leaders of the Military Council in Niamey to retract their seizure of power by force expired, putting the option of military intervention on the table.

The situation in Niamey is similar to what happened in Sierra Leone in 1998, in which ECOWAS had previously intervened, Saleck said, adding that the possibility of military intervention is "strongly likely."

Saleck attributes this likelihood to the very narrow window for a diplomatic solution, in addition to the fact that the credibility of ECOWAS is at stake following inaction after the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea.

External pressures also bring closer the prospect of armed intervention, which is supported by that have military forces in Niger, particularly the United States and France.

"The security repercussions remain the most dangerous in the event of any military action in Niger, which lies at the intersection of belts of cross-border violence"

The US State Department announced its support for ECOWAS efforts to restore constitutional order in Niger, including military intervention as a last resort, while the French Foreign Ministry announced that it is coordinating closely with Washington to restore constitutional and democratic order in Niger.

In Niamey, pro-coup demonstrators have taken to the streets denouncing any foreign intervention, particularly hostile towards ECOWAS and the former colonial power.

Obaid Amigen, A Mauritania-based political analyst of African affairs, believes that a military intervention lacks tactical capacity.

In light of ECOWAS’ shortage of units on the ground, the neutralisation of the French forces in Niger, and the latter’s closure of its airspace, Amigen believes that there is nothing left but direct airstrikes on the presidential palace, “which constitutes a risk with undesirable consequences.”

Amigen explained that this would constitute “a declaration of war on an independent and sovereign country, run by the de-facto authority, and allied with its neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso.”

���� risks the life of the overthrown president who is being held inside the palace, and this situation enhances the margin of bargaining and movement among putschists," he added.

Not all analysts are convinced that military intervention is imminent. African affairs expert notes that there is significant division within ECOWAS, with several countries not yet on board.��

Within Nigeria, the largest country and leader of the bloc, there is also division between President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who is enthusiastic about the military solution, and the Senate that rejects this step.

As Al-Shafei notes there are also obstacles with the financing of such an operation, and the logistical preparation that such an intervention would require on short notice.

Regional repercussions

In view of the alliance between Niger and the military juntas of Mali and Burkina Faso, any such intervention against Niamey, “will prepare the coup de grâce in the body of ECOWAS and perhaps will accelerate its disintegration,” Amigen said.

In addition to this, it seems likely that the outbreak of war in Niger will lead to the formation of large waves of refugees heading towards neighbouring countries, taking advantage of the tribal ties that extend across the borders, which will put humanitarian and economic pressure on already fragile countries in the region, such as Chad.

A full blown war will also increase the activity of human smuggling gangs and the number of irregular asylum seekers from heading towards Europe via North Africa, which will increase the burdens on the countries of the region.

The security repercussions remain the most dangerous in the event of any military action in Niger, which lies at the intersection of belts of cross-border violence, whether from the Lake Chad basin or the Sahel region.

It is also possible that the Islamic State (IS) contingent in the Sahara will seek to exploit the state of chaos and instability to expand its influence in the Lake Chad basin and extend west, thus relieving pressure on its affiliated jihadist groups in Niger, According to Oraby Oraby, a researcher in Islamist movements.

Oraby told TNA that this tactic will increase the possibility of IS areas in Nigeria connecting with eastern Niger, and thus escalating violence against civilians and government forces across the region, adding to the security and humanitarian threats.

It seems likely that the coup authorities in Niger will seek the help of Wagner mercenaries active in Mali to confront any military move against them, which may lead to penetration by the private security company in the north of the country and give it control over uranium rich areas.��

The expansion of Wagner and by extension Russian influence in the region may force France to confront its rival superpower, either directly or through recruiting tribal militias.

This kind of move will turn the coup and prospect of military intervention into a cross-border ethnic war, which will increase hostilities between local communities, complicate the security map, and open the door to proxy wars.

Abdolgader Mohamed Ali is an Eritrean journalist and researcher in African Affairs.

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