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Yevgeny Prigozhin’s attempted insurrection against the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) last month created massive confusion. The rebellion raised many questions about what might come next for the war in Ukraine and the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule.

Other important questions pertain to the Wagner Group’s ‘March of Justice’ and the failed mutiny’s implications for Moscow’s foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

In September 2015, Russia intensified its direct military intervention in Syria, helping to give President Bashar al-Assad’s government the upper hand in the conflict. That Russian military campaign greatly contributed to perceptions of Moscow’s power and ability to shape the MENA region’s security architecture.

In light of last month’s Wagner Group crisis in Russia, these perceptions could change, especially if Putin’s ability to operate in the MENA region decreases due to his government’s need to focus more on Russia’s internal situation and the conflict in Ukraine.

The Wagner Group’s attempted uprising “contributes to the sense of weakness in the Russian state, the vulnerability of the regime, and an increasing state of dissatisfaction within the elite,” Dr Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, said in an interview with ������.

“Middle Eastern governments and other actors in the region are bound to look at this as yet another sign that Russia has been overestimated, largely because of its relative success in Syria - albeit against a hodgepodge of relatively ragtag rebels with limited arms, many divisions, often no coordination, and a distinct lack of unified command and control, to say the least - and that, as a renewed global power, the Russian Federation is not really ready for prime time,” added Dr Ibish.

Other experts agree that perceived weaknesses in Putin’s government following Prigozhin’s rebellion will have an impact on Russia’s image in the MENA region.

“Middle Eastern governments and societies must now acknowledge the possibility that Putin is not as strong as they once thought (or just hoped), and that he may not be in a position to help them all that much,” Dr Mark Katz, a professor at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government, told TNA.

“While in the past they just had to concern themselves with Putin's policy preferences, now they must think about the possibilities that elements within the Russian security services may not necessarily be willing or able to carry them out,” according to Dr Katz.

“They may also be concerned that Moscow is not in a position to export as many arms to them as they would like due to the Russian military's need for them to fight against Ukraine.”

Moscow’s ability to play an influential role in MENA countries will depend in no small part on the future of the Wagner Group and the actions of the mercenaries in it. In the Arab countries such as Libya where the Wagner Group constitutes the dominant Russian presence, it will be important to see who controls the mercenary forces.

Will it be the Russian MOD, Prigozhin, or local Wagner commanders on the ground who might strike special deals with local governments in exchange for money? At this stage, it is too early to tell.

“We will be able to say a great deal more about the Wagner Group, its future, and the implications for the Middle East when we get a stronger sense of what the future of the organisation is,” said Dr Ibish.

“Under such circumstances, most questions about the impact of the ill-fated Wagner group mutiny in the Middle East or elsewhere are premature. They can't be answered, because it all depends on what happens to that organisation and its fighters. And that very much remains to be determined.”

While it is unclear what the Wagner Group will look like in this upcoming period, a host of scenarios need to be carefully considered. “If the regional organisation and infrastructure of the Wagner Group survive intact and are transferred to direct Russian government control, there might not be much of a difference,” said Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International and a Middle East analyst, in an interview with TNA.

“Wagner units are most active in Libya, but that conflict is at a low ebb at the moment. Even if the Russian presence lapses to some degree, it might not matter too much as long as it doesn’t evaporate altogether.”

Political finessing might be necessary if the Wagner Group does transform into a formal state entity, added Lund. “Hiring a private company to train soldiers and kill some people is one thing, but inviting a foreign military to base itself in your country is another matter. At least, that’s how others might view it.”

However, in Syria, which hosts Russian military bases, the Wagner Group’s transformation into the Russian military might not necessarily be a difficult process, at least compared to other countries such as the Central African Republic or Mali. “If Wagner mercenaries in Syria put on new hats and become Russian soldiers, what’s the big deal?” Lund asked.

The situation in Syria

As the most pro-Russian Arab state, Syria is extremely tied to Moscow. Thus, Assad’s government has high stakes in the future of Russia’s foreign policy. Both from a security perspective and in grander geopolitical terms, the fallout from Prigozhin’s insurrection could be felt in powerful ways in Syria.

For the Damascus government, the timing could have been worse. Had this attempted insurrection occurred at an earlier stage of the Syrian crisis, when the regime in Damascus was fighting an existential battle, the Assad government could have suffered much more. Today, Russia’s military role in Syria is less important to Assad’s regime than at previous points.

“Assad is fortunate in that Russian forces have already helped reduce the capabilities of his internal opponents, and that external powers previously aiding them seem less interested in doing so now,” Dr Katz told TNA.

That said, the Wagner Group crisis in Russia is still troubling to officials in Damascus. Some experts maintain that the Wagner Group crisis in Russia last month could easily result in Moscow losing some clout in Syria, which can open the door to other regional actors such as Iran and Gulf Arab states filling some voids.

“Assad, though, must be concerned that Putin's need to focus on internal matters and the Ukraine war might result in his withdrawing Russian forces from Syria,” said Dr Katz. “He may also be concerned that rivalry between Russian military forces and Wagner fighters in Syria might erupt, making them both less effective.”

In the days which followed the Wagner Group’s failed mutiny, Russian military forces went to Syrian bases and facilities to arrest some Wagner leaders, which reduced the mercenary force’s clout in Syria.

“This is a big blow to the Assad regime because the Assad regime has made direct partnerships with Wagner in terms of security provisions, and the Wagner Group has provided vital logistical, tactical, and military training assistance for many years,” Dr Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told TNA.

“Also, it’s important to keep in mind that the original clash between Prigozhin and [Minister of Defence Sergei] Shoigu was in Syria. It was over the Wagner Group’s desire to go over Shoigu’s head and deal directly with Assad. I think that any kind of disruption, or any kind of infighting between the Wagner Group and the Russian MOD will be a bit uneasy for Assad. It will probably result in Assad leaning on his newfound Arab partners, as well as on Iran. So overall, I think it reduces Russian influence in Syria,” added Dr Ramani.

Given the current circumstances, Turkey might seize opportunities to take actions in Syria that could inflame tensions between Damascus and Ankara following many months of Russian efforts aimed at bringing about a reconciliation between the Syrian and Turkish governments.

If Moscow is not there to counter Turkey’s military involvement in Syria, it is possible that Damascus will turn more to Arab governments that have already had ongoing rapprochements with Assad’s government.

“You do see Damascus increasing its regional outreach, de-conflicting with some former foes and rebuilding old friendships,” said Lund. “Doing so makes a lot of sense if you think Russia might draw down support and you need new backers to fill the gap.”

The bigger picture

It is difficult to confidently predict how last month’s Wagner Group revolt will impact the MENA region. How these tensions between Prigozhin and the Russian MOD will play out is far from clear. Nonetheless, it seems safe to bet that many Arab states could come to perceive Russia differently due to this fiasco.

Perceptions of Russia as increasingly weak will probably push MENA governments toward taking a greater interest in China as a global actor in the region which, in some (but not all) ways can serve as an alternative to the United States, at least far more effectively than Russia.

This is not to say, however, that one should expect any government in the MENA region to sever relations with Moscow. Nor is it to deny that all actors in this part of the world have no choice but to continue viewing Russia as a power to contend with in an increasingly multipolar world defined by declining US hegemony.

“In general, aside from the lack of solidarity between Putin and various Arab leaders, I don’t think there will be that much that’ll be changing in terms of Russia and the Middle East,” Dr Ramani told TNA. “I think it’ll mostly be business as usual.”

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.

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