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Despite fighting side by side in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are also competing for influence and leadership within the region.

Yemen's strategic location and resources make it an important arena for exerting power, leading to competition between these two allies despite sharing general objectives such as restoring the internationally recognised government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and countering Iran-backed Houthi rebels.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have both sought to secure their maritime interests in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are critical global trade routes. They have been particularly concerned about the Houthi rebels gaining control of Yemen's coastline, including the strategic port city of Hodeidah.

Controlling these areas would potentially allow the Houthis to disrupt maritime traffic and pose an imminent threat to the security of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Conversely, control of the country’s coastlines, which lie in the vicinity of global shipping lanes, offers an opportunity for the Emiratis and Saudis not just to bypass the increasingly volatile Strait of Hormuz and avoid direct Iranian threats, but also to avoid competition with other powers, especially China and Turkey, which have been active, especially around the Horn of Africa.

The UAE's rising maritime ambitions

The UAE initially had similar objectives to those of Saudi Arabia in Yemen but later adopted a more independent approach, pursuing its interests in southern Yemen through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking greater autonomy or independence for southern Yemen.

Moreover, the UAE’s hefty investments in naval forces (such as a $982 million  for four Falaj-3 offshore patrol vessels) clearly show the country’s maritime ambitions. The Emiratis have also joined several regional initiatives, such as Operation Sentinel, which aims to protect navigation and international trade in the Hormuz strait, as well as the EMASOH, a French-led European patrol and surveillance mission in Hormuz, by hosting its headquarters.

Besides the diplomatic and military dimensions, the UAE has made significant geo-economic investments around waterways in the region, with  being the main driving force of the emerging UAE geo-commercial maritime “empire”.

 According to Dr Jens Heibach, a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), DP World is a major pillar in the UAE’s diversification strategy and probably the most important one.  

Moreover, the UAE has managed to gain control over major strategic ports and coastal points, including Aden, Hadramawt, Shabwa, and Taiz, as well as the archipelago of Socotra and the island of Mayun (also known as Perim) in the Bab al-Mandab strait.

“The UAE's approach in Yemen is driven by a fundamental objective to restore local and regional stability,” Dr Moran Zaga, a researcher of the Gulf States, policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and lecturer at the University of Haifa and the Hebrew University, told ������.

“Despite the clear advantages of its trading dominance, the UAE's interests are not heavily dependent on Yemen, making it less inclined to maintain a significant military influence in the country. Therefore, it is likely that the UAE will continue to explore diplomatic solutions through dialogue, a path the Saudis are also currently pursuing,” she added.

Saudi Arabia follows a similar path

Saudi Arabia has followed a similar strategy, focusing on securing control over important ports in the country - such as Mahra Nistun, Mukalla, and Mokha - through a Riyadh-friendly government.

In theory, this would, among other benefits, allow the kingdom to build a pipeline to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and denying the Houthis or Iran the chance to disrupt Saudi oil exports. Saudi maritime goals have been also outlined in the country’s Vision 2030 plan and are primarily focused on the Red Sea, as the kingdom aims to develop itself as a major touristic and logistic regional hub.

To achieve these goals, Saudi Arabia initiated the creation of the Red Sea Alliance in 2020 to improve cooperation in the areas bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. So far eight countries besides the kingdom, including Jordan, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, and Yemen have joined the initiative.

As roughly 10 percent of global oil exports go through Bab El Mandab, according to the US Energy Information Administration, most of it coming from the Gulf, it is understandable why Saudi Arabia has been interested in increasing security in the Red Sea, which has been plagued by piracy and terror groups from Somalia. The constant fear that Iran may establish a stronger foothold in Yemen and the Red Sea through its Houthi allies has also contributed to this initiative.

However, some experts such as Abdullah Baabood  that the absence of some of the region’s key players, such as Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and even the UAE, may hamper the effectiveness of the alliance.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has also launched a diplomatic offensive and approached its adversaries in Sana’a and Tehran. But, while the ongoing negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Houthis as well as the recent détente between Riyadh and Tehran are certainly welcome, such arrangements are still too fragile to be taken for granted.

Hence, the kingdom’s positions in Yemen, as well as at home, remain highly vulnerable, especially its crucial energy facilities which have been targeted on many occasions in the past.

How strong is the Saudi-UAE alliance in Yemen?

Despite disagreements with the UAE, and their often-rival agendas in Yemen, both countries still remain more or less on the same page in trying to block Houthi ambitions to exert control over the country, including strategic ports. For how long, though, remains the question.

The establishment of a Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in Riyadh in April 2022 was one step towards finding a compromise between the two allies. Nevertheless, although the new governmental body comprised of factions supported by either the UAE or Saudi Arabia was initiated to overcome existing cleavages, it remains deeply divided, with local proxy forces involved in occasional clashes against each other.

Nevertheless, Zaga believes that “the historical evidence demonstrates their ability to overcome numerous challenges by adopting a pragmatic approach. These countries understand that their success is interlinked, and cooperation is essential”. She also noted that with Saudi Arabia aiming to host Expo 2030, an era of regional reconciliation is anticipated, fostering a positive environment for collaboration.

And yet, the complex situation in the country suggests that this is easier said than done, as their interests also diverge. 

“The UAE has developed a strong presence in parts of south Yemen and in many ways, the outcome of ongoing Houthi-Saudi talks will not change this fundamental reality. The UAE, in particular, supports the Southern Transitional Council politically and militarily, which has emerged as the most powerful secessionist actor in the south,” Thomas Juneau, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa, told ������.

Moreover, the complete withdrawal and abandonment of strategic posts in Yemen would be a severe blow to UAE/Saudi maritime ambitions. Therefore, Juneau does not see a viable scenario in the foreseeable future in which the UAE agrees to stop or significantly reduce its presence in southern Yemen.

“It has become an essential element in its strategy to project power in the region, especially in the waters that surround the Arabian Peninsula,” he told TNA.

However, while the UAE’s ambiguous position is complex but manageable at the moment, it will be increasingly difficult to walk this fine line as the STC continues its efforts to promote independence.  

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had important disagreements in Yemen for years now, but so far, they have mostly been able to manage their divergences.

As Saudi efforts to withdraw from Yemen intensify, Juneau expects Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to find it increasingly difficult to contain these tensions, and as a result, clashes between local actors supported by them are likely to escalate.

Stasa Salacanin is a freelance journalist who has written extensively on Middle Eastern affairs, trade and political relations, Syria and Yemen, and terrorism and defence.